Indian Allotment Water Rights by Collins, Richard B.
University of Colorado Law School 
Colorado Law Scholarly Commons 
Articles Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship 
1985 
Indian Allotment Water Rights 
Richard B. Collins 
University of Colorado Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles 
 Part of the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons, Legal History Commons, State and Local 
Government Law Commons, Supreme Court of the United States Commons, and the Water Law 
Commons 
Citation Information 
Richard B. Collins, Indian Allotment Water Rights, 20 LAND & WATER L. REV. 421 (1985), available at 
https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles/1021. 
Copyright Statement 
Copyright protected. Use of materials from this collection beyond the exceptions provided for in the Fair Use and 
Educational Use clauses of the U.S. Copyright Law may violate federal law. Permission to publish or reproduce is 
required. 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship at Colorado Law 
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Colorado Law 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact jane.thompson@colorado.edu. 
Citation:
Richard B. Collins, Indian Allotment Water Rights, 20




William A. Wise Law Library
Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Fri Sep 22 18:16:50 2017
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
                                     Use QR Code reader to send PDF to





VOLUME XX 1985 NUMBER 2
Indian Allotment Water Rights
Richard B. Collins*
Allotted tribal lands create troublesome questions for western
water lawyers. In this article the author reviews the history of basic
Indian reservation water rights created by the Supreme Court's
landmark decision in Winters v. United States. He then explains
the disposition of those rights when reservation lands are allot-
ted Finally, he discusses the difficult issues that arise when allot-
ted lands pass from the federal trust become subject to state law,
and are transferred to non-Indians.
Wherever there are Indian allotments and water is valuable, legal
disputes have arisen over the federal water rights appurtenant to
allotments. Although Congress has primary authority over the subject,
it has provided only general legislative standards. The courts have been
required to make most of the governing rules. They have recognized federal
water rights appurtenant to Indian allotments, and at least some federal
water rights have survived transfer of the allotments to non-Indian suc-
cessors. Several questions remain unsettled.
Some of the uncertainty is part of the broader question of the general
scope of federal Indian reservation water rights. Allotment water rights
mostly derive from tribal rights, and allotment rights compete with the
water rights that tribes retain. One issue is the proper measure of tribal
water rights for irrigated agriculture, stock watering, domestic use,
fisheries, and power generation. Another is whether tribes have federal
water rights for other purposes, such as mining, manufacturing, or
recreation.
*Associate Professor, University of Colorado School of Law. This article is based on
a talk given at a symposium entitled "The Federal Impact on State Water Rights," which
was sponsored by the Natural Resources Law Center of the University of Colorado School
of Law in Boulder, Colorado, June 11-13, 1984.
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Other allotment water rights questions arise from transfers, trust
removal, and subjection to state law. There have been disputes over how
much of a tribe's federal water right passed to allotment owners when
allotments were made, and over how much of an allottee's water right sur-
vives termination of the federal trust over the allotment and transfer to
non-Indians. The last question can also be posed as one of federalism
because state law applies to most former allotments, and undeveloped
allotment water rights conflict with state water law.
Unlike most other questions about Indian water rights, the unsettled
allotment issues do not place Indians squarely at odds with non-Indians.
Rather, current owners of allotments and former allotments are arrayed
against competing users of scarce water supplies. Tribes, Indians, and
non-Indians can appear on either side in a particular case.
INDIAN RESERVATION WATER RIGHTS'
Origin of Reservation Rights
The federal government inherited the British royal monopoly over ac-
quisition of land from Indian tribes. Throughout the nineteenth century,
the federal government busily extinguished original tribal title to vast
territories. Most of the land acquired was then sold or given to non-Indian
farmers, ranchers, miners, loggers, railroads, and others, and to the states.
Usually this enterprise was accomplished with at least nominal Indian
consent by purchase from the tribes.2
An important part of the consideration Indians received was federal
recognition of tribal ownership of smaller tribal domains. In time, the re-
tained tribal lands came to be called Indian reservations, and the tribal
title recognized as part of the consideration for tribal cessions was deter-
mined to be a federal property interest protected by the taking clause of
the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution.3 Most tribal reser-
vations first recognized by the United States were later reduced by fur-
ther tribal cessions, but the federal government also unilaterally set aside
Indian reservations out of federal lands no longer in original Indian title.
The process reached a rough equilibrium in the 1920s, leaving the Indian
reservations of the present.
4
The federal government's plan for Indians on reservations was cultural
assimilation. Indians were to become self-supporting, Christian agricul-
turalists like their white neighbors. When the reservation scheme reached
arid parts of the West, the question arose whether Indian reservations
1. Federal Indian water rights have been described both as "reserved rights" and as
'reservation rights." Reservation rights is used in this article because it seems to facilitate
descriptions. No doctrinal judgment is intended by this choice.
2. See Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28, 34-43 (1947).
3. See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 407-24 (1980).
4. Since the 1920s, there have been new reservations established and older ones ter-
minated, but the net effect is minor compared with previous events.
The equilibrium described in the text was in the forty-eight contiguous states. In Alaska,
the principal settlement of original native title was made by the Alaska Native Claims Set-
tlement Act of 1971, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628 (1982). Hawaii has a distinct history. See FELIX
S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 797-810 (1982 ed.).
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had any water rights for agricultural uses. Various actions of Congress
and the Executive in the late nineteenth century showed the expectation
that Indian reservations would have irrigation water.5 But the govern-
ment was vague about the source and extent of Indian water rights and
about their relation to state law water rights of non-Indian claimants. Res-
ervation Indians had not been subject to state laws,' but the allotment
laws ambiguously modified that rule.7 Indian reservation water rights were
left to the courts, and the legal rules that followed were influenced strongly
by the facts of the earliest cases.
The water rights of reservation Indians owe their modern existence
in part to the favorable, but not too favorable, facts of the Supreme Court's
first case on the question, Winters v. United States.8 Winters involved
the Fort Belknap Reservation in Montana, a product of the cession and
reduction process described above.9 The middle of the Milk River formed
Fort Belknap's northern boundary, and the river was the reservation's
major natural water source. In 1889, the Bureau of Indian Affairs estab-
lished an agency on the Milk River and diverted water from the river for
the agency's domestic and irrigation needs. 0 An 1896 land cession
generated tribal funds that were used to build irrigation works on Fort
Belknap, and additional diversions from the Milk River began in 1898."
5. See infra notes 11, 17 and text accompanying notes 63-69.
6. See FELIX S. COHEN, supra note 4, at 259-70.
7. The Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, § 6, 24 Stat. 390, provided that when an allotment
was made, the "allottee" was subjected to state civil and criminal laws. Application of this
section caused difficulties, and Congress amended it in 1906 to postpone imposition of state
law until an allotment goes out of trust. Act of May 8, 1906, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182 (codified
at 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1982)). The Supreme Court construed later statutes to amend the 1906
rule, so that former allottees within self-governing reservations are subject to state laws
only to the very limited extent that other reservation Indians are. Moe v. Confederated Salish
& Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 477-79 (1976).
In any case, the original section 6 was never thought to affect issues about the land
itself. The land was always treated as continuously governed by federal law during the trust
period. See, e.g., United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432 (1903).
8. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
9. An 1855 treaty and an 1874 statute set aside all of Montana east of the continental
divide and north of the Missouri River as a reservation for several tribes. Act of Apr. 15,
1874, ch. 96, 18 Stat. 28; Treaty with the Blackfoot and others, Oct. 11, 1855, art. 4, 11 Stat.
657, 658.
Most of the 1874 reservation was ceded in 1888 with the tribes retaining three scat-
tered reservations including Fort Belknap, named for a Civil War general who later became
secretary of war. Act of May 1, 1888, ch. 213, 25 Stat. 113, ratifying agreements made with
the tribes in December and January of 1886-87. The agreements make several references
to agriculture, farms and cultivation, but none to irrigation or water.
The other two reservations defined by the 1888 statute also involve the Milk River.
Some of its headwaters were on the Blackfeet Reservation, and it forms part of the boun-
dary of the Fort Peck Reservation. These reservations were not involved in Winters.
10. Winters, 207 U.S. at 566; see also Hundley, The "Winters" Decision and Indian
Water Rights: A Mystery Reexamined, 13 WEST. HIST. Q. 17, 23, 28, 32 (1982).
11. Winters, 207 U. S. at 566. See Act of June 10, 1896, ch. 398, § 8, 29 Stat. 321, 350
(ratifying an agreement with the Ft. Belknap Indians made Oct. 9, 1895). The Indians ceded
the southern part of the 1888 reservation for $360,000 payable at $90,000 per year. The stated
purposes for which the money could be used included "assisting the Indians to... irrigate
their farms." Id. at 351 (art. II).
The Milk River arises on the east side of the continental divide in northern Montana
and in southern Canada and flows east-south-east into the Missouri. Canadian claims were
already a complication at the time of Winters. See Hundley, supra note 10, at 27, 41.
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In the meantime, non-Indian settlers had begun diverting the river above
the reservation. The Indian Service diversion of 1889 was prior to any
lawful non-Indian diversions, but some of them antedated the 1898 In-
dian irrigation project.
In the spring of 1905, upstream diversions and a drought dried up
the Milk before it reached Fort Belknap. Indian Service officials prompt-
ly sought legal protection for the reservation water supply, and the United
States Attorney in Helena sued to enjoin twenty-one upstream irrigators.
The federal circuit court granted a temporary restraining order and then
a preliminary injunction, protecting the reservation's pre-existing use of
5,000 miner's inches of water." The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed in 1906 and the Supreme Court affirmed in 1908.11
The facts of Winters were favorable to the Indians. They had already
put to use a substantial amount of water, and non-Indians had greedily
taken all of it. But the facts were not too favorable. The United States
Attorney filed his bill based primarily on the theory of prior appropria-
tion by the Indian Service. He was a careful lawyer and alternatively al-
leged a federal riparian right and "other rights" to accomplish "the ends
... for which . .. the reservation was created.""' He had first believed
the reservation diversions preceded those of the defendants, but they
claimed in their answer that they had diverted before the principal reser-
vation use began in 1898. This was probably fortuitous. Many other non-
Indian irrigators were not sued, and it seems likely that some of them
had appropriated after 1898.15
Out of such chances, the Fates shape the future. In his opinion sus-
taining a preliminary injunction, United States District Judge William
H. Hunt gave life to the third legal theory hinted in the bill. He reasoned
that the Indians' cession of the lands later acquired by the defendants
had implicitly reserved to the Indians a water right in the Milk River suf-
ficient for their reasonable needs. 6 The court obviated the issue of who
actually diverted first, since the Indian right vested before any non-
Indians were able to acquire land ownership in the Milk River watershed.
12. See Hundley, supra note 10, at 19-33.
13. Winters v. United States, 143 F. 740 (9th Cir. 1906), permanent injunction aff'd,
148 F. 684 (9th Cir. 1906), affd, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
14. See Hundley, supra note 10, at 23-24.
15. The United States tried to sue only upstream users who had appropriated after
the Indian irrigation use began in 1898. The twenty-one defendants were hastily chosen from
an estimated 225 to 250 non-Indian users of the Milk River. Hundley, supra note 10, at 23-24.
The Government's complaint alleged that the 1898 reservation use began prior to defen-
dants' appropriations. Winters, 207 U.S. at 566-67. Defendants claimed in their answer that
their uses preceded 1898. Id. at 568-69. The Ninth Circuit decided that, "[tjhe proofs show
... [defendants'] appropriations of water, were made during the years 1895, 1900, and 1903."
Winters, 143 F. at 742.
16. See Hundley, supra note 10, at 25-27. Judge Hunt stated in his opinion that the
defendants could "acquire no rights to the exclusion of the reasonable needs of the Indians,"
and the Indians had "reserved the right to the use of the waters of Milk River, at least to
an extent reasonably necessary to irrigate their lands." Id. at 26-27.
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The case was affirmed by the appellate courts on the same theory.'7 Thus
came Indian reservation water rights into the consciousness of water
lawyers.IS
The Winters decision defined the basic theory of Indian reservation
water rights, which the federal courts have consistently followed. The
theory has been applied to all federal reservations, and its leading state-
ment by the modern Supreme Court involved a wildlife reserve:
This Court has long held that when the Federal Government
withdraws its land from the public domain and reserves it for a
federal purpose, the Government, by implication, reserves appurte-
nant water then unappropriated to the extent needed to ac-
complish the purpose of the reservation. In so doing the United
States acquires a reserved right in unappropriated water which
vests on the date of the reservation and is superior to the rights
of future appropriators. Reservation of water rights is empowered
by the Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, which permits federal regula-
tion of navigable streams, and the Property Clause, Art. IV, § 3,
which permits federal regulation of federal lands. The doctrine ap-
plies to Indian reservations and other federal enclaves, encompass-
ing water rights in navigable and nonnavigable streams ...
In determining whether there is a federally reserved water
right implicit in a federal reservation of public land, the issue is
whether the Government intended to reserve unappropriated and
17. The court of appeals quoted Judge Hunt's conclusion that the Indians were enti-
tled to use Milk River water "at least to an extent reasonably necessary to irrigate their
lands." Winters, 143 F. at 749. The opinion also referred to reservation uses for domestic
and stock watering purposes. Id, at 741. The Supreme Court's opinion was less specific and
used some language that suggested that the Indians were entitled to all the Milk River flow.
Winters, 207 U.S. at 577. But the Court affirmed in all respects, and its opinion also recited
domestic, stock watering, and irrigation uses. Id at 576. In context, it agreed with the lower
court's theory.
Justice Brewer dissented without opinion, probably because the decision conflicted with
part of his opinion in Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
Congress anticipated the Winters theory in the Act of Mar. 1, 1899, ch. 324, § 1, 30
Stat. 924, which authorized irrigation rights of way across the Uintah Reservation
subject at all times to the paramount rights of the Indians on said reservation
to so much of said waters as may have been appropriated, or may hereafter
be appropriated or needed by them for agricultural or domestic purposes; and
it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Interior to prescribe such rules and
regulations as he may deem necessary to secure to the Indians the quantity
of water needed for their present and prospective wants....
18. Early recognition of Winters appeared in S. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN
STATES 136 (2d ed. 1908).
It is easy to speculate about what might have occurred if any of the material cir-
cumstances in Winters had been different: If the 1905 officials of the Indian Service had
not shown courage and dispatch; if the Department of Justice had not responded in kind;
if any of these officials or Judge Hunt had shared the anti-Indian bigotry of the day, or the
Judge had less legal imagination. The case might also have changed if the physical facts
had been different. If the Indian reservation had not been making needed uses, there would
have been no spur to action nor pressing equities for an Indian right. If the particular defen-
dants had not made a colorable claim of prior use, the decision might have rested on prior
appropriation by the Indian Service.
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thus available water. Intent is inferred if the previously unap-
propriated waters are necessary to accomplish the purpose for
which the reservation was created. 9
Priority of Reservation Water Rights
The Winters Court held that water was reserved for the Fort Belknap
Reservation under the federal laws and treaties recognizing the reserva-
tion. Because federal reservation rights are effective on the date a federal
reservation is set aside and are superior to any rights vesting thereafter,
they are relatively valuable, a point made by the facts of the Winters case.
There have been claims that because some Indian water rights are
based on original Indian land title, the water rights should have a prior-
ity dating from the time of the tribes' first ownership or use, a very early
priority indeed. These claims seem meritorious only when a tribe had a
continuous, actual water use before federal recognition of its reservation. 0
In these cases, it is reasonable to infer treaty or federal intent to protect
the tribes' existing use with a priority date of original use. No such in-
tent can be inferred when a reservation purpose was new at the time the
reservation was recognized, as was usually the case for irrigated agricul-
19. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138-39 (1976) (citations omitted).
20. There has been a debate among some commentators over whether the Winters
holding was based on tribal reservation of water in original Indian title or instead on federal
reservation of water. This debate has the unfortunate consequence of placing undue emphasis
on the difference between reservations set aside by agreement with the Indians and those
set aside by unilateral federal action. Federal law is the basic source of tribal reservation
rights, and the proper question is the intended scope of the treaty, statute, or executive order
setting aside a reservation.
The principal significance of bilateral agreements is that the Indians' understanding
is a relevant factor in determining the scope of a treaty or agreement. But the Supreme Court's
rules for construing Indian affairs statutes tend to minimize this difference. Whether a law
is bilateral or unilateral in origin, the Court will interpret it generously to protect the In-
dians' reasonable expectations at the time. See Washington v. Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443
U.S. 658, 675-76 (1979) (treaty); Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89
(1918) (unilateral act of Congress). An Indian reservation will be defined to protect the In-
dians' pre-existing possessory rights unless the contrary intent clearly appears. See United
States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 353-54 (1941).
Applied to water rights, this principle should protect actual prior uses, including in-
stream uses, with their original priority. Any different rule would make the treaty or statute
setting aside the reservation into an implicit impairment of Indian possessory rights. But
the federal government's plan to convert Indians into farmers involved a new water use in
most cases, so the priority of this use is usually the reservation date. A reservation set aside
out of public domain and not in any existing Indian use at the time it is set aside necessarily
establishes new uses with a reservation date priority.
The decided cases fit this analysis. In United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1412-15
(9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3536 (1984), a reservation water right was recognized
under an 1864 treaty for both irrigated agriculture and for hunting, fishing and gathering.
The court held that the latter purposes were in pre-existing tribal use and had a priority
date of first tribal use, characterized as "time immemorial." Irrigation was held to be a new
use with an 1864 priority date. See also Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963), in
which the reservations were out of public domain and no pre-existing Indian uses were shown.
The Court held that the water rights were "effective" on the reservation dates. See also United
States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., No. 59 Globe Eq., decree at 86 (D. Ariz. June 29, 1935)
(decree of water with "immemorial date of priority" to Gila River Tribes, whose members
had been irrigators before European contact; decree of water with reservation priority to
Apaches, who had not previously irrigated).
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ture. In most cases, the date of reservation priority is early enough that
the question about an earlier original use date is immaterial.
Quantity of a Reservation Right
A difficult issue posed by federal reservation water rights is that of
water quantity. In Winters, the United States proved pre-existing use of
5,000 miner's inches, and the trial court enjoined the defendants from in-
terfering with reservation use of that amount. The decree was affirmed




Reasonable need is an imprecise standard, but it was sufficient for
the Winters case and other early injunctive suits. The courts had to deter-
mine only the Indians' present uses that required immediate judicial pro-
tection. In no instance was the amount used so great or profligate to raise
any doubt that the water was needed and the use was reasonable. But
the seed of future difficulty was sown. The Winters theory logically in-
cluded enough water for future Indian needs, and some courts explicitly
said So.
22
Reasonable need, without reference to the price of water or the cost
of its development, is an inherently uncertain standard because the
amount of water it is reasonable to use is a function of prices. Moreover,
as Indian lands are developed and population grows, the Indians'
reasonable needs grow. By contrast, one of the basic purposes of state
water laws in the West is certainty of allocation. Under state prior ap-
propriation law, surface water rights are limited to reasonably definite
quantities actually put to use, making clear to a prospective user how
much water remains unappropriated."
For private users this conflict was largely theoretical because Indians
lacked the capital to put most of their reservation water rights to use.
Unused federal water rights do not require junior claimants to let the water
remain in the stream.24
Federal, state, and local officials with broader planning concerns took
a different view. As surface water sources in the West became fully ap-
propriated, quiet title suits were brought to quantify all rights on stream
systems. These actions required the courts to convert the open-ended stan-
dard of the Indians' future needs into fixed allocations. The courts met
this problem in a pragmatic way. Some lower courts quantified reserva-
21. See supra notes 16, 17.
22. United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321, 326-27 (9th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 988 (1957); Conrad Investment Co. v. United States, 161 F. 829, 831
(9th Cir. 1908); see Winters, 143 F. at 749, 207 U.S. at 576.
23. See Clark, Introduction to Water Law of the Western States, in 5 WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS (R. Clark ed. 1972).
24. This is apparent from the scope of the injunctions in Winters and in Conrad In-
vestment Co. v. United States, 161 F. 829 (9th Cir. 1908). See also United States v. Ahtanum
Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d at 335, 340; Tweedy v. Texas Co., 286 F. Supp. 383, 386 (D. Mont.
1968); United States v. Hibner, 27 F.2d 909, 911-12 (D. Idaho 1928).
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tion water rights for irrigation purposes as enough water to irrigate all
of the Indians' arable land on the reservations. 2" In Arizona v. California,
the Supreme Court refined the standard to be the quantity of water need-
ed to irrigate all practicably irrigable Indian land on the reservation.2 6
Opponents of reservation rights argue that the practicably irrigable
acreage standard is too generous to the Indians because it awards them
the maximum amount of water they could ever protect under a reasonable
needs test, an amount many of them will not need.27 The Court's implicit
answer was that the practicably irrigable acreage standard is the quid
pro quo for achieving the certainty of a one-time quantification. Also, the
standard reflects the moral footing of the reservation right in basic fairness
to the Indians.
Other critics object that the Court's standard is too complex and
uncertain. 28 But any realistic litigation standard will be complex. Most
water quantification suits are already complicated by the large number
of necessary parties.29 And a quiet title action has the purpose and result
of ending the uncertainty."0 In context, the Court's practicably irrigable
acreage standard is no more difficult than analogous damages adjudica-
tions that courts regularly undertake.2 In summary, the practicably ir-
rigable acreage standard is a reasonable measure of a reservation's water
right for the purpose of irrigated agriculture.
25. E.g., United States v. Powers, 16 F. Supp. 155 (D. Mont. 1936), vacated on this
point, 94 F.2d 783, 786 (9th Cir. 1938), affd, 305 U.S. 527 (1939); cf United States v. Truckee-
Carson Irrigation Dist., 649 F.2d 1286, 1289-95 (9th Cir. 1981) (describing trial court litiga-
tion in quiet title case between 1913-44), affd in part, rev 'd in part sub noa. Nevada v. United
States, 103 S. Ct. 2906 (1983).
26. 373 U.S. 546, 600-01 (1963), decree entered, 376 U.S. 340 (1964), amended decree
entered, 383 U.S. 268 (1966), modified, 439 U.S. 419 (1979), modified, 460 U.S. 605 (1983).
27. See id. at 596-601 (1963) (arguments of the State of Arizona); Shrago, Emerging
Indian Water Rights: An Analysis of Recent Judicial and Legislative Developments, 26 ROCKY
MTN. MENi. LAW INST. 1105, 1113-17 (1980).
28. See Sondheim & Alexander, Federal Indian Water Rights: A Retrogression to Quasi-
Riparianism?, 34 So. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1960).
29. Clyde, Practical Aspects of Water Litigation and General Adjudication Proceedings,
in 6 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 512, 530 (R. Clark ed. 1972).
30. In Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 615-28 (1983), the Court made it clear that
Indian reservation rights are no exception to this rule. See also Nevada v. United States,
103 S. Ct. 2906 (1983).
Congress has provided any interested party with a statutory means to bring federal
and Indian rights before a court having jurisdiction to quantify all water rights in a stream
or other source. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1982). See Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 103 S. Ct.
3201 (1983); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
31. The greatest difficulty is posed by the relative prices of crops, energy, and capital,
especially the latter. The courts have assumed zero cost for undeveloped water. The amount
of water decreed can shift very much with small changes in the discount rate used to calculate
the feasibility of irrigation. New technology poses a related problem. See Report of the Special
Master, General Adjudication of All Rights to Use of Water in the Big Horn River System
and All Other Sources, State of Wyoming, No. 4993 (Wyo. Dist. Ct. Dec. 15, 1982) [hereinafter
cited as Big Horn Master's Report]; In re: The General Adjudication of All Rights to Use
Water in the Big Horn River System and All Other Sources, State of Wyoming, No. 4993
(Wyo. Dist. Ct. May 10, 1983), modified, No. 101-234 (Wyo. Dist. Ct. June 8, 1984) [hereinafter
cited as Big Horn Adjudication].
The Supreme Court in Arizona v. California was satisfied with its special master's resolu-
tion of these issues, a resolution based on prices and technology at the time of the quiet
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Purposes Defining Reservation Rights
The practicably irrigable acreage standard meets the Indians' needs
only for irrigation water. The reservation right extends to other purposes
for which reservations were set aside. Indian reservations were established
for the residence and support of Indian people, so that many water uses
can be, and have been, claimed to be part of the reservation right.
Some uses other than irrigation have been recognized by the courts.
The Winters Court included domestic and stock watering uses, but these
require only modest amounts of water, negligible quantities when com-
pared with irrigation.12 Lower courts have sustained Indian claims to
minimum stream flows needed to maintain Indian fisheries and water
power uses.33 These instream uses are important but nonconsumptive.
They can be accommodated to state law water rights in many cases,
although power uses may present future use problems.
3 4
title litigation. 373 U.S. 546, 600-01, (1973). But interest rates were more stable then than
now, and the discount rate was the focus of more attention when Arizona v. California was
reopened in 1980. See Burness, Cummings, Gorman & Lansford, The "New "Arizona v. Califor-
nic Practicably Irrigable Acreage and Economic Feasibility, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 517 (1982).
An additional complication arises when a parcel of Indian trust land might be irrigated
from more than one potential source. The courts have ignored this question when the In-
dians' water was already developed. E.g., Winters, 207 U.S. at 570. But in undeveloped water
cases, an alternate source can affect Indian claims. E.g., Colville Confederated Tribes v.
Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 45 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
32. Domestic use for cities is large but in many cases would probably be precluded as
not foreseeable.
33. United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1412-14 (9th Cir. 1983) (fishing, hunting,
gathering), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3536 (1984); Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Trans-Canada
Enterprises, Ltd., 713 F.2d 455 (9th Cir. 1983) (fishing), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1324 (1984);
Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 48 (9th Cir. 1981) (fishing), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1092 (1981); United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 104 F.2d 334, 340 (9th
Cir. 1939) (power); United States v. Anderson, No. 3643, slip. op. at 9-11 (E.D. Wash. July
23, 1979), affd, 736 F.2d 1358, 1365 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. 5,677.94 Acres of Land,
162 F. Supp. 108, 114-15 (D. Mont. 1958) (power). See Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon,
349 U.S. 435, 444 (1960) (power); 34 Op. Att'y Gen. 171, 178 (1924) (power).
The Court in Arizona v. California awarded a reservation right only for agricultural pur-
poses, but no other uses were claimed. The court in the Big Horn Adjudication rejected claims
for nonagricultural purposes for the Wind River Reservation. See supra note 31, No. 101-234,
slip op. at 9-11, 17 (Wyo. Dist. Ct. June 8, 1984); id. No. 4993, slip op. at 14-20, 42, 60-63,
69 (Wyo. Dist. Ct. May 10, 1983).
Some courts have concluded that a decreed reservation right for one purpose ought to
be transferable to another on-reservation use, at least to the extent that junior rights are
not impaired. United States v. Anderson, No. 3643, slip op. at 11-12 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 23,
1982), affd, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984). See Walton, 647 F.2d at 48 and authorities cited
therein. Transfers to off-reservation uses are more controversial. See Anderson, No. 3643
slip op. at 17-20 (sustaining off-reservation use to process minerals mined on reservation
but denying use unrelated to reservation); Big Horn Adjudication, supra note 31, No. 4993,
slip op. at 20, 65 (Wyo. Dist. Ct. May 10, 1983) (tribes may sell, lease, or change uses of
water within reservation but may not do so outside it). See also Trelease, Indian WaterRights
for Mineral Development, in NATURAL RESOURCEs LAW ON AMERICAN INDIAN LANDS 230-33
(P. Maxfield ed. 1977). In distinguishing between transfers within or without tribal reserva-
tions, these courts may be misstating the issue. Tribes ought to be able to transfer federal
water rights for use on other Indian land, wherever located. But there is no authority to
transfer tribal water rights for use on land owned by non-members of the tribe, wherever
this land is located.
34. In order to quiet title for uses other than irrigation, a court must again compute
a present value for the Indians' future needs. Present values for fishery uses should be readily
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More difficult issues are posed by Indian claims to water for mining,
industrial, or recreational reservoir uses that would be heavily consump-
tive and hard to limit by any standard akin to practicably irrigable
acreage.3 5 There are not yet any significant decisions on point. The courts
may construe reservation rights not to include some of these uses by
excluding uses not foreseeable at the times reservations were set aside. 6
Reservation Groundwater Rights
The decided cases on reservation water rights have dealt almost en-
tirely with surface water. The few cases involving groundwater, together
with the reasoning of the surface water cases, make it likely that reserva-
tion rights to groundwater will be recognized where the requisite need can
be shown.3 7 But there are a number of questions about the definition of
groundwater reservation rights.
quantified because a minimum stream flow to sustain a pre-existing Indian fishery can be
calculated with reasonable accuracy. Anderson, No. 3643, slip op. at 9-11. Cf Cappaert v.
United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141, 143 n.7 (1976) (minimum water level to sustain rare fish
in desert pool). But other non-irrigation uses will have no convenient measure akin to prac-
ticably irrigable acreage. For example, power sites are readily identified but their present
value is heavily dependent on future prices of power. Power uses may be limited to supply-
ing power for other purposes defining the reservation right, that is, domestic, irrigation, and
other agricultural uses.
35. Some mining uses of reservation water may be quantifiable without undue difficul-
ty. But most mining, industrial, and recreational uses are more dependent on the relative
prices of the product, energy, and capital, than are irrigation uses.
36. Because the Supreme Court, in Arizona v. California, based the reservation right
solely on agricultural uses, opponents of the right cite the case as authority that there can
be no reservation right for other uses. This argument is unlikely to succeed. When the prin-
cipal value of a reservation is for fishing or timber harvesting, denying water for these pur-
poses would be arbitrary and unfair, as a number of courts have recognized.
Tribal claims for heavily consumptive industrial or recreational uses are more likely
to be rejected or reduced when these uses were not foreseeable at the time reservations were
set aside. The Winters standard looks to the time of reservation recognition to determine
reservation purposes. This standard could include any purpose that assists Indians in sup-
porting themselves. But the need for a predictable reservation right will probably lead the
courts to adopt a more specific foreseeability test. They might recognize water rights for
some mining purposes but not for off shale or synthetic fuels. Tribes will probably be able
to apply reservation rights that are quantified by agricultural purposes to these modern uses.
A court might recognize additional reservation purposes as they are discovered or ac-
tually put to use, with a priority date of discovery or use. For example, discovery or develop-
ment of a mineral deposit would add a water right sufficient to develop the deposit or a right
to water actually used to develop the deposit, with a corresponding priority date. This theory
has not been advocated for Indian reservations, but a version of it has been claimed for other
federal reservations. See Federal Water Rights of the Nat'l Park Service, 86 Interior Dec.
553 (1979), overruled, 88 Interior Dec. 253 (1981).
A possible occasion to consider this theory was presented in Walton, 647 F.2d at 48.
The tribes claimed water for a new fishery begun with introduced fish and for a supporting
hatchery. The court sustained the claim and awarded it a reservation priority date. It is dif-
ficult to understand how this use could have been foreseen when the reservation was set
aside. The court justified the new fishery as a replacement for a fishery on a different water-
shed that had been destroyed by dams. This was a reasonable justification to recognize the
new fishery, but not to give it a reservation priority date.
37. The reported holdings sustaining groundwater claims involved groundwater con-
nected with surface sources. In Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976), the Court
affirmed a decree enjoining Cappaert's groundwater pumping to the extent that it interfered
with a prior federal reservation of hydrologically connected surface water necessary to sup-
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Groundwater supplies that fully renew annually may be treated like
surface supplies, but most pumped supplies in the West either reach a
new equilibrium at a lower water table or are steadily depleted. In these
cases, if Indians have a prior right to the natural pressure level on their
land, then other landowners overlying the same aquifer would often be
precluded from pumping at all. For this reason, it seems likely that the
courts will define reservation groundwater rights differently than surface
rights.
Three state law doctrines suggest possible resolutions. The reasonable
use and correlative right doctrines allocate groundwater rights based on
surface ownership. 8 The modified prior appropriation doctrine allows
junior appropriators to impair senior well-pressure rights to a reason-
able extent but limits the overall number of appropriators using an
aquifer.3 Each of these systems is grounded on a rule of reason that shares
use of an underground source among surface owners. The reservation
groundwater right could be based on or fit within any of these doc-
trines."0
port a rare fish. In Walton, 647 F.2d at 45, the court recognized reservation water rights
in a "hydrological system, consisting of an underground aquifer and ... creek," but no
party made any argument against a reservation right in groundwater. In Anderson, No.
3643, slip op. at 4, the court held: "Where surface and groundwaters are hydraulically related,
as they are in this case, the reservation of water applies to ground as well as surface
water."
In Tweedy v. Texas Co., 286 F. Supp. 383, 385 (D. Mont. 1968), the court said there
is a federal reservation right in groundwater, but like the surface right it is a right of use,
not of absolute ownership. Since the plaintiffs could not show any impairment of their water
uses, relief was denied. In Nevada v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 600 (D. Nev. 1958), affd
on other grounds, 279 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1960), the state sued to enjoin federal pumping
of underground water on a military reservation without a state-issued permit. The district
court ruled that the United States did not need a permit. The court of appeals held that
the suit was barred by sovereign immunity. See also Applicability to Indian Lands of Arizona
Law Regulating Withdrawals of Ground Water, 61 Interior Dec. 209 (1953) (state ground-
water law not applicable to reservation Indians). Cf Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340 (1964)
("Consumptive use from the mainstream within a State shall include all consumptive uses
of water of the mainstream, including water drawn from the mainstream by underground
pumping... "); United States v. Smith, 625 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1980) (action by United States
on behalf of Indian tribes against groundwater pumper alleged to interfere with Indians'
surface water rights; no interference proved).
Groundwater on many Indian reservations has in fact been pumped, often under ex-
plicit statutory authority. E.g., Act of Feb. 14, 1920, ch. 75, 41 Stat. 408, 414, 416, 423.
In the Big Horn Adjudication, the court purported to deny any reservation water right in
groundwater but sustained a right to all existing Indian groundwater uses. Supra note 31,
No. 4993, slip op. at 37-42, 61, 64, 70 (Wyo. Dist. Ct. May 10, 1983).
Most commentators conclude that reservation groundwater rights will be recognized.
See, e.g., Meyers, Federal Groundwater Rights: A Note on Cappaert v. United States, 13
LAND & WATER L. REV. 377, 388 (19781.
38. See Clark, Western Ground-Water Law, in 5 WATERS AND WATER RiGHTS § 441
(R. Clark ed. 1972); Davis, The Right to Use Water in the Eastern States, in 7 WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS § 619 (R. Clark ed. 1976).
39. See Clark, Ground Water Law: Problem Areas, 8 NAT. RESOURCES LAWYER 377 (1975);
Clark, Ground Water Legislation in the Light of Experience in the Western States, 22 MONT.
L. REV. 42 (1960).
40. See Pelcyger, Indian Water Rights: Some Emerging Frontiers, 21 ROCKY MTN. MIN.
L. INST. 743, 759-64 (1978).
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The Effect of Tribal Land Transfers on Reservation Water Rights
The Winters Court's reasons to imply a reservation water right ex-
tend to any Indian reservation with recognized title that is dry enough
to show need. The Supreme Court in Arizona v. California held that reser-
vations set aside by unilateral action of Congress or the Executive have
the same implied water right.II At one time the extent of tribal lands was
very great, but most of this land has long since passed out of tribal owner-
ship. The greater part was ceded to the United States, much was allotted
in trust to individual members of tribes, and the rest has been retained
in tribal trust.
Winters water rights did not survive outright cessions to the United
States. Most of the lands acquired from tribes were opened to disposi-
tion under the public land laws. Public lands statutes required grantees
of the United States to obtain new water rights under state law. 2 These
laws necessarily had the effect of extinguishing federal reservation water
rights when tribal ownership was unconditionally ceded to the United
States.
In a few instances, lands acquired by the United States from Indian
tribes were directly transferred to different federal reservations, such as
national forests. In United States v. Adair, the government claimed that
land transferred from an Indian reservation to a national forest and a
wildlife refuge retained its reservation water right for purposes common
to the Indian and successor reservations with a continuous priority dating
from the founding of the Indian reservation."3 The Ninth Circuit rejected
that claim,44 but a similar claim was sustained in United States v. City
and County of Denver." The Colorado Supreme Court held that land
transferred from national forest to national park use had a continuous
water right for purposes common to the two reservations dating from the
founding of the forest reserve. These cases may be distinguishable because
the circumstances in City and County of Denver showed a continuous
reservation purpose more clearly than did the circumstances in Adair. In
any case, the amount of water needed for national forest purposes is small
and the use is not consumptive, so the issue is a minor one."
41. 373 U.s. 546, 598-600 (1963).
42. See California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 162
(1935); Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1362-63. This rule has been followed even when government
diversion works were conveyed with the patent. Nevada Ditch Co. v. Bennett, 30 Or. 59,
102-05, 45 P. 472, 484-85 (1896). See also Story v. Woolverton, 31 Mont. 346, 78 P. 589 (1904)
(military reservation).
This rule does not apply to tribal cessions in trust conditioned on future sales. If these
lands are later restored to tribes, the original Winters right remains. Big Horn Master's
Report, supra note 31, at 35-44, 270; Big Horn Adjudication, supra note 31, No. 4993, slip
op. at 23 (Wyo. Dist. Ct. May 10, 1983).
Parcels within Indian irrigation projects may also be an exception to this rule. See in-
fra text accompanying notes 94-112.
43. 723 F.2d 1394, 1417-19 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3536 (1984).
44. Id
45. 656 P.2d 1, 30-31 (Colo. 1983).
46. See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978); United States v. City and
County of Denver, 656 P.2d 1, 20-34 (Colo. 1983).
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The Supreme Court has held that allottees of tribal land acquired the
right to use a portion of their reservations' water right. 47 But the nature
and extent of the right acquired by allottees has not been established,
and a number of cases have raised questions about how the end of the
federal trust affects allottees' federal water rights. These issues are re-
viewed in the remainder of this article.
THE ALLOTMENT SYSTEM
Allotment was a major federal policy to compel assimilation of tribal
Indians. Beginning in 1854, most federal treaties recognizing tribal reser-
vations gave individual Indians the right to obtain exclusive use of parcels
of reservation land for agricultural self-support . 4 These treaty clauses were
nominally consensual, but their prevalence and uniformity of wording
strongly imply that they were essentially imposed on tribes. After 1871,
allotment clauses continued to appear in agreements ratified by federal
statute.4 9 In 1887, Congress abandoned the veneer of consent and passed
the General Allotment Act authorizing the President to require that reser-
vations be allotted.0 Separate agreements and statutes for particular
reservations carried out the General Allotment Act's mandate." Under
one or more of these acts, most reservations were at least partially allotted.
After every Indian family on a reservation had received an allotment
under the General Allotment Act or a special allotment act, the remain-
ing tribal common land could be declared "surplus" and disposed of under
the public land laws.52 Sometimes these "openings" to non-Indian settle-
47. United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527 (1939).
48. See FELIX S. COHEN, supra note 4, at 613. There were fifty-seven such treaties from
1854 until treaty-making ended in 1871. See 11 CONG. REC. 1060 (1881) (listing all treaties
providing for allotment).
All these treaty clauses entitled a tribal family to acquire exclusive use of a parcel of
tribal land for agricultural purposes and authorized the President to protect improvements
and allow some kind of succession on death. Some clauses expressly allowed patents to issue
if the land was actually cultivated. See, e.g., Treaty with the Eastern Band Shoshonees and
Bannack, July 3, 1868, art. 6, 15 Stat. 673, 675; Treaty with the Oto and Missouri, Mar.
15, 1854, art. 6, 10 Stat. 1038, 1039.
49. In 1871, Congress formally ended the making of treaties with Indian tribes. Act
of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1982)). The House
of Representatives sought the statute because the House members objected to the Senate's
exclusive role in treaty ratification. The government nevertheless continued to make formal
agreements with Indian tribes that were ratified by statute. FELIX S. COHEN, supra note
4, at 107, 127. For decades after 1871, these agreements were commonly called "treaties,"
even by Congress and the courts. See, e.g., Winters, 143 F. at 743 ("the treaty of May 1, 1888").
50. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-381 (1982). Similar bills had been debated since 1879. All those serious-
ly considered had included a requirement of tribal consent, until it was removed during the
final debate in the House. See 18 CONG. REc. 225 (1886); FELIX S. COHEN, supra note 4, at
130-32.
51. See FELIX S. COHEN, supra note 4, at 613.
52. General Allotment Act, § 5, 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1982). See FELIX S. COHEN, supra note
4, at 131,138, 613-14. Under this section, "surplus" land sales were to be made by agreements
with tribes, retaining the traditional notion of tribal consent. But after 1904 a number of
"surplus" land sales were mandated by Congress without tribal consent. See, e.g., Rosebud
Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977).
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ment ended the Indian reservation status of the area opened except for
the islands of remaining trust allotments.5 3 In other instances, the reser-
vation boundaries remain intact.
54
The General Allotment Act provided that allotments be held in trust
by the United States for a fixed period of twenty-five years. Then they
would be patented to allottees in unrestricted fee simple and made sub-
ject to state land laws.5 5 But the trust period could be extended by ex-
ecutive order, a power frequently used. 6 In 1934, Congress ended the
policy of automatic trust expiration, and since then all allotment trust
periods have been extended indefinitely. 7
Indian allotments may be transferred in trust to other Indians by in-
testate succession, devise, or voluntary inter vivos transfer. 8 Trust
allotments may also be leased to non-Indians for agriculture, mining, or
other purposes. They may go out of trust and be transferred in unrestrict-
ed fee to non-Indians, becoming subject to state tax and alienation laws.59
But as already explained, the trust no longer expires automatically at the
end of a fixed trust period. Federal statutes permit individual Indian allot-
tees to have trust restrictions removed or to alienate free of restrictions
if the Department of the Interior approves. 60 Estates of deceased allot-
tees are administered by Interior, and allotments may pass free of trust
to non-Indians by inheritance, devise, or sale." In sum, Indian allotments
are held in indefinite trust status unless an Indian owner elects to have
the trust removed or dies and is succeeded by non-Indian heirs, devisees,
or purchasers. Thousands of allotments have gone out of trust.
62
Recognition of Allotment Water Rights
When tribal lands were allotted, the trust patents made no mention
of water rights. Yet it is clear that Congress expected allottees in dry areas
to have some right to irrigation water. Section 7 of the General Allotment
Act states:
In cases where the use of water for irrigation is necessary to render
the lands within any Indian reservation available for agricultural
purposes, the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to prescribe
53. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. at 586-88.
54. Solem v. Bartlett, 104 S. Ct. 1161 (1984).
55. See supra note 7.
56. See FELIX S. COHEN, supra note 4, at 614.
57. I& at 614-15.
58. See id at 618-27, 632-38. The federal trust precludes any form of involuntary transfer.
Id. at 618-19.
59. See idt at 413-29, 619-27, 632-38.
60. See id at 619-22. Some years ago, the Government issued "forced" fee patents
against the wishes of allottees. This policy was ended in 1921. Id at 136-37.
61. See id at 632-38. When fee patents are issued for allotments of deceased Indians
or for inter vivos sales when the allottee has not been declared "competent," the grantor
is the United States (trustee), not the allottee (beneficiary). When an allottee is found "com-
petent" and gets a fee patent, a later sale or gift is in the allottee's name. This difference
matters only if state law had some effect on an allottee after the fee patent was issued.
62. Id at 138.
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such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to secure
a just and equal distribution thereof among the Indians residing
upon any such reservations; and no other appropriation or grant
of water by any riparian proprietor shall be authorized or permit-
ted to the damage of any other riparian proprietor. 3
Section 7 is based on the concept that each allottee should have the
use of the allotment's fair share of whatever irrigation water the reserva-
tion has, and it empowers the Secretary to assure allottees of their water
shares." But the Secretary's regulatory power has largely gone unexer-
cised. We have no comprehensive administrative interpretation." Nor does
section 7 tell us the source or extent of allottees' water rights.
Some of the special allotment acts for particular reservations adverted
to irrigation.66 These also show Congress' understanding that Indian allot-
tees would have water for irrigation, but the statutes again do not make
clear the source or extent of allotment water rights.
Several statutes authorized the Secretary to acquire developed irriga-
tion water supplies for reservation Indians as consideration for granting
irrigation companies water access and ditch easements on Indian trust
lands.6 7 Most of these laws said nothing about the nature of the water
rights acquired by the Indians or those of the companies.'
Congress has regularly provided tribal and federal funds for construc-
tion and maintenance of water supply and irrigation works on Indian
reservations." These appropriations statutes also lack any general defini-
tion of Indian water rights.
In the 1939 case of United States v. Powers, the Supreme Court re-
viewed what Congress and the Department of the Interior had done and
held that allotments have an appurtenant right to the use of a share of
the federal reservation water right."0 But the case did not require the Court
63. Ch. 119, § 7, 24 Stat. 390 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 381 (1982)).
64. See United States v. Powers, 16 F. Supp. 155, 159-60 (D. Mont. 1936), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 94 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1938), affd, 305 U.S. 527 (1939). Section 7 was added
to an allotment bill in 1884 in the same form as later enacted. The Senate Indian Affairs
Committee drafted it. See 15 CONG. REc. 2241 (1884). No committee report then or later ex-
plained it. It may have been added in response to a senator's objection during an earlier
debate. See 11 CONG. REC. 785 (1881) (statement of Sen. Morgan).
The reference to "riparian proprietor" may reflect the drafters' assumption that only
riparian allotments would have water rights based on the common law of water rights in
the eastern states. See Anderson v. Spear-Morgan Livestock Co., 107 Mont. 18, 27, 79 P.2d
667, 669 (1938) (dictum). Other courts have ignored this part of the statute.
65. See United States v. Alexander, 131 F.2d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 1942).
66. E.g., Act of May 30, 1908, ch. 237, 35 Stat. 558 (Ft. Peck Res.).
67. E.g., Act of Feb. 15, 1897, ch. 228, § 8, 29 Stat. 527 (Gila River Res.); Act of July
23, 1894, ch. 152, § 2, 28 Stat. 118 (Yakima Res.).
68. But see Act of Feb. 10, 1891, ch. 129, § 1, 26 Stat. 745 (Umatilla Res.).
69. See infra text accompanying note 94.
70. 305 U.S. 527 (1939). See also United States v. Pierce, 235 F.2d 885, 891 n.6 (9th
Cir. 1956).
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to specify the nature or extent of allottees' rights, and the Court did not
volunteer a clear definition."
An allottee's right to use a share of tribal water should be measured
by the same criteria used to measure the tribe's reservation right. Each
allotment's share should be determined by reasonable water needs for allot-
ment purposes.12 Irrigation uses are limited to the water needed to irrigate
the allotment's practicably irrigable acreage.73
Retained tribal rights for other purposes could pose problems. If a
tribe retains a reservation right to maintain a fishery or power site or to
operate a mine, it may be difficult to apportion the available water be-
tween tribal and allotment rights. Tribes have legislative authority over
their members in Indian country and have some authority over non-
Indians.1 But allotment water rights are federal property interests pro-
tected against tribal as well as state infringement.75 Tribal authority to
allocate water between allotted and tribal land has not been tested."
Trust Transfers of Allotments
Few trust allotments are now owned by original allottees. By the time
the first allottees died or sold, most allotments remained undeveloped.
It has consistently been assumed that trust transfers-mostly by intestate
succession-implicitly include the allotment's water right. That is, the
allotment heir has the same right as the original allottee to put to use
a share of the reservation water right. This assumption seems plainly cor-
rect. The purposes of the federal allotment laws are the same for an In-
dian heir as for the ancestor.7 Also, the rule of most water law systems
is that appurtenant water rights are implicitly transferred with the land
unless the written conveyance or the circumstances show a contrary
71. See infra text accompanying notes 132-47.
The federal water right acquired by allottees could have been limited to water actually
put to use before allotment, but this would make little sense. Most allotments were
undeveloped when made and there was no system for allottees to acquire new water rights.
Hence, the allotment right was at least an inchoate right to put to use a share of the tribal
reservation right, as the courts have held or assumed. See infra note 126 and accompanying
text.
72. The allotment laws' purpose was to distribute land for farming and grazing. E.g.,
25 U.S.C. § 331 (1982). Later, some allotments were made solely as home sites, and Con-
gress allowed all allotments to be leased for mining. 25 U.S.C. § 396 (1982). It is uncertain
whether a tribal reservation water right for mining, if one exists, would be divided by
allotment.
73. Walton, 647 F.2d at 48, 51.
74. Compare New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 103 S. Ct. 2378 (1983) with Mon-
tana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). See also FELIX S. COHEN, supra note 4, at 248-57.
75. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 348, 349, 381 (1982); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912). Cf
Conroy v. Conroy, 575 F.2d 175 (8th Cir. 1978) (discussing tribal jurisdiction over trust
allotments in a divorce action).
76. Disputes have arisen, however, between tribes and non-Indian owners of former
allotments. See infra note 126 and Ninth Circuit cases cited therein.
77. See FELIX S. COHEN, supra note 4, at 128-32.
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intent. 8 There is nothing about trust transfer of allotments to justify a
departure from this rule.
Some Indians acquired trust allotments from public lands rather than
tribal common lands. 9 Other allotments were acquired by purchase."
When these allotments were set aside in trust, the reservation water right
theory may have applied to reserve unappropriated water sufficient for
allottees' reasonable needs (including any water already in use on the
allotment).8 1 Neither public domain nor purchased allotments have yet ap-
peared in reported water rights cases. If a reserved right is recognized,
it would be subject to the rules applicable to allotments made out of tribal
lands.8 2
Water Rights of Leased Allotments
Federal statutes allow trust allotments to be leased for agricultural,
mining, or other purposes." Mining leases may last until the minerals are
commercially exhausted, and other leases may be made for long periods.
8
4
The leasing laws do not refer to water rights, nor do any other statutes
expressly authorize water rights to be leased with the land. But some allot-
ment lease statutes expressly apply only to "irrigable land," implying that
an appurtenant water right may be leased with the land.8 ' Another federal
statute allows allotments within certain irrigation projects to be leased
78. See United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358, 1363 (9th Cir. 1984); Clark & Martz,
Classes of Water and Character of WaterRights and Uses, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS
§ 53.4 (R Clark ed. 1967).
79. FELIX S. COHEN, supra note 4, at 615, 627; General Allotment Act, § 4, 25 U.S.C.
§ 334 (1982). This section remains in force as do a few similar provisions. See 43 C.F.R. §§
2530.0-3 to 2533.2 (1984).
80. See FELIX S. COHEN, supra note 4, at 615; 25 U.S.C. § 335 (1982) (applying General
Allotment Act to purchased allotments).
81. The general rule on federal conveyances of public lands is stated in California Oregon
Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935). But federal policy always
protected the Indians' possessory rights, a rule applied to individual Indians as well as tribes.
See Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219 (1923). Applied to water rights, this policy prob-
ably protects actual uses of water being made by Indians at the time a public domain allot-
ment was patented.
82. An informal opinion of the Interior Solicitor concluded that public domain allotments
have no implied reservation water right. Op. Solic. Dep't of Interior (August 19, 1955), re-
printed in 2 OPINIONS OF THE SOLICITOR OF THE DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR RELATING TO INDIAN
AFFAIRS 1688 (Gov't Printing Office 1978). The Solicitor's only reason was that no prece-
dent recognized the right. This begs the question because no precedent denies a right either.
Public domain and purchased allotments are statutory Indian country. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(c)
(1982). Some of them are subject to a nearby reservation tribal government and are jurisdic-
tionally the same as allotments within reservations. FELIX S. COHEN supra note 4, at 346-47.
Others are not subject to a tribal government and are probably subject to state law to a
greater extent. Id. at 277-78, 350. Both categories should be distinguished from allotments
out of tribal land where the surrounding reservation has been disestablished leaving the
allotments outside any reservation. The latter category has been recognized to retain a reser-
vation water right. See Skeem v. United States, 273 F. 93 (9th Cir. 1921); United States
v. Hibner, 27 F.2d 909 (D. Idaho 1928).
83. 25 U.S.C. §§ 380, 390, 393-396, 403, 415-415d (1982).
84. See 25 C.F.R. §§ 162.1-162.20, 212.1-212.33 (1984).
85. 25 U.S.C. § 394 (1982) allows leasing of allotments that are "arid but susceptible
of irrigation" by allottees unable to occupy or improve the land. See 25 U.S.C. § 402a (1982)
(leases of irrigable land owned by tribes); Act of Apr. 30, 1908, ch. 153, 35 Stat. 70, 95, 97
(allotments on Uintah, Uncompahgre, and Wind River Res.).
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with water rights." More importantly, in 1921 the Ninth Circuit held that
a general agricultural lessee of a trust allotment may use the reservation
water right appurtenant to it.87 There are no other reported cases, but
the decision seems to have been followed by the Interior Department and
lease parties, even for mining leases.88 The current statute governing most
allotment surface leases expressly allows leases for the purpose of develop-
ing the land's "natural resources.''89 The lease term probably includes
water rights2
No federal statute allows allotment water rights to be leased for use
on land other than the allotments to which the rights are appurtenant.
Water is not considered a mineral for purposes of federal mineral leasing
laws, so water rights cannot be severed from the land by leasing.'
WATER RIGHTS OF FORMER ALLOTMENTS
As shown above, owners of trust allotments made out of tribal lands
implicitly acquired shares of the tribe's federal reservation water right.
These shares pass to trust transferees of original allottees, and the shares
may be used by lessees of allotments. In these situations, allotments are
continuously held in federal trust and remain federal Indian country. 2
In all relevant respects, the property is subject only to federal law.
When allotments go out of federal trust, the protections and im-
munities of the federal allotment laws are removed. The land becomes sub-
ject to state or tribal law. 3 State and tribal law must recognize vested
86. 25 U.S.C. § 390 (1982) (San Carlos, Ft. Hall, Flathead, and Duck Valley Res.). See
25 C.F.R. § 162.13 (1984).
87. Skeem v. United States, 273 F. 93 (9th Cir. 1921). The land had been leased under
what is now 25 U.S.C. § 403 (1982).
88. See United States v. Anderson, No. 3643, slip op. at 17-19 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 23,
1982), aff'd, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984); Op. Solic. Dep't of Interior (Feb. 1, 1964), reprinted
in 2 OPINIONS OF THE SOLICITOR OF THE DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR RELATING TO INDIAN AF-
FAIRS 1930 (Gov't Printing Office 1978) (approving lease of reservation land with its irriga-
tion water right for a resort development and housing); Mining Lease between Sentry Royalty
Co. and the Navajo Tribe (June 6, 1966) (contract no. 14-20-0603-9910) (coal lease with right
to pump groundwater for coal slurry pipeline). Use of the federal water right for nonagricultural
purposes could be based on either recognition of such purposes or on transfer of an irrigation-
defined right to a different use.
89. 25 U.S.C. §§ 415-415d (1982).
90. See S. REP. No. 375, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1955). The history does not specifically
state that water rights were assumed to be included in the term "natural resources." But
it refers to leases for irrigated agriculture and to farming leases calling for investment by
the lessee, suggesting the assumption.
91. See Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Products Co., 436 U.S. 604, 605-07 (1978).
92. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1982). See FELIX S. COHEN, supra note 4, at 39-41.
93. Outside Indian country, the federal trust title is the only general source of federal
preemption. Its removal subjects the land and events on it to ordinary state jurisdiction.
See 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1982); FELIX S. COHEN, supra note 4, at 349-52, 380, 410-11. Within
Indian country, removal of the federal trust title leaves the land subject to the general federal
preemption protecting tribal self-government. On most matters, Indians and their property
are subject to tribal rather than state jurisdiction. Tribal jurisdiction over allotments is then
unfettered by the federal trust title. Non-Indians and their property in Indian country are
subject to state jurisdiction when Indians are unaffected. Otherwise, they are subject to
limited tribal jurisdiction. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, 103 S. Ct. 2378 (1983);
See FELIX S. COHEN, supra note 4, at 348-49.
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federal property rights, but neither the statutes governing removal of the
federal trust nor the fee patents issued under those statutes explicitly
refer to allotment water rights. The effects of trust removal and subjec-
tion to state law are left to the courts.
The courts have had difficulty deciding the effects of trust removal
on federal water rights of former allotments and have had problems ac-
commodating state law to federal rights. Some courts have held that no
federal water rights survived removal of the federal trust, while others
have held that non-Indian successors have federal rights similar to those
of Indian allottees. Often cases have arisen many years after allotments
went out of trust and were transferred to non-Indians. The courts have
probably been influenced by the transferees'apparent reliance interests
that have accrued during these years of delay.
Some courts have had difficulty because they have failed to recognize
two important distinctions between classes of former allotments. First,
former allotments within Indian irrigation or federal reclamation projects
have a different history than other allotments. The nature of these pro-
jects and the statutes that govern them minimize problems of determin-
ing allotment water rights and of accommodating those rights to state
water law.
The second distinction is between federal water rights that are
developed and those that are undeveloped when non-project allotments
go out of trust and are subjected to state law. Whatever part of their
federal reservation water rights allottees put to use ought to be vested
federal property rights that survive removal of the trust. This rule can
be easily accommodated to western state water law because state water
rights are based on developed uses of water.
When water rights of non-project allotments are undeveloped at the
time they pass out of trust, arguments to limit or extinguish the rights
are stronger. Undeveloped federal water rights conflict with state laws
that limit water rights to amounts in beneficial use and that provide for
forfeiture of water rights that are unused for extended periods. Policies
of the federal allotment laws offer arguments against continuing protec-
tion of unused allotment water rights. It is not surprising that the courts
have reached inconsistent results in adjudicating undeveloped water rights
of former allotments.
Water Rights of Former Allotments Within Irrigation Projects
When the federal government bought land from Indian tribes, much
of the money was kept in trust accounts in the Treasury subject to Con-
gress' control. Congress "appropriated" these trust funds for various pur-
poses it deemed beneficial to tribal owners, including development of reser-
vation water supplies. Congress also appropriated federal funds for In-
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dian reservation irrigation projects. Some were made reimbursable by
tribes, others were gratuitous.
94
Most Indian irrigation projects were built to serve allotments. Even-
tually Congress and the Bureau of Indian Affairs realized that it was in-
equitable to use tribal funds to build and maintain projects that benefited
only some members, so Congress began to require reimbursement from
the landowners served. Some allottees' capital reimbursement obligations
were deferred until the end of the trust. Others were payable during the
trust."
Before 1900, Indian reservation irrigation projects were managed local-
ly by reservation superintendents. In that year, Congress provided for
two Indian Service superintendents of irrigation. The central office grew
into a separate irrigation division in the Bureau of Indian Affairs that
became known as the Indian Irrigation Service. 97 But the Indian irriga-
tion bureaucracy was overshadowed by the powerful Reclamation Service
of the Department of the Interior."" Some Reclamation Service projects
included Indian trust lands, and some Indian irrigation projects were built
by the Reclamation Service and then turned over to the Indian Irriga-
tion Service.99 As a result, Reclamation Act procedures became entangled
with Indian irrigation project management.
Under the Reclamation Act, projects were built with federal funds to
serve lands in project areas. Lands previously in private ownership were
served, but much project land was public domain reserved under the
Reclamation Act for project purposes. Reclamation projects acquired
water rights in conformity with state or territorial law by purchase, ex-
change, or condemnation, or by new appropriations. Farms to be irrigated
were sold to entrymen with project water rights, and buyers had to reim-
burse the federal government for the capital costs of construction and
water rights acquisition. This scheme was applied to lands for which ir-
rigation was only planned, as well as for lands already irrigated when sold.
Reimbursement was to begin only after water was actually delivered. Pay-
ment was spread over many years, and the land was subject to a lien un-
til final payment was made. 10
94. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 13, 152, 153, 157, 158, 160, 161,161a, 162a (1982); L. SCHMECKEBIER,
THE OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 237-42 (Johns Hopkins Press 1927).
95. The exceptions were in the Southwest, where some tribes had established agricultural
systems that were allowed to continue.
96. See L. SCHMECKEBIER, supra note 94, at 241; Assessment of Charges on Lands
Within Indian Irrigation Projects, 51 Interior Dec. 613 (1926).
97. See L. SCHMECKEBIER, supra note 94, at 238-42, 280-81; Officer, The Indian Ser-
vice and Its Evolution, in THE AGGRESSIONS OF CIVILIZATION 65, 67, 69, 71 (S. Cadwalader
& V. Deloria eds. 1984).
98. See Act of June 17, 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C.
§§ 371-473 (1982)); Burness, Cummings, Gorman & Lansford, United States Reclamation
Policy and Indian Water Rights, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 807 (1980).
99. See L. SCHMECKEBIER, supra note 94, at 239-42.
100. See Sax, Federal Reclamation Law, in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 110-125,
at 111-291 (R. Clark ed. 1967); Trelease, Reclamation Water Rights, 32 ROCKY MTN. L. REV.
464 (1960).
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After 1902, parts of this scheme were imitated in Indian irrigation
projects. Under the General Allotment Act, all tribal members were to
be given allotments, and any remaining land could then be declared
"surplus" and sold to the United States or opened to entry on the tribe's
account. 01 When "surplus" lands were within Indian irrigation projects,
they were sold to entrymen with express project water rights as under
the Reclamation Act.1"2 When allotments within irrigation projects went
out of trust and were sold under federal control, the United States adver-
tised and sold them with explicit project water rights in the same
manner. 103
For these reasons, owners of former Indian allotments within irriga-
tion or reclamation projects own project water rights. Rights were express-
ly conveyed to them, and they paid for them, albeit aided by the generous
subsidies of these projects.
Prior to 1902, many managers of Indian reservation water projects
appropriated water without complying with state or territorial law. 0 4 But
there was doubt about what was required, and there were instances when
reservation superintendents at least filed notices of appropriation under
state law.'"' After 1902, the Reclamation Act had an influence. Four
statutes required specific Indian irrigation projects to appropriate water
under state laws. 1' The Indian Service decided that some other projects
101. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
102. See Act of May 30, 1908, ch. 237, § 2, 35 Stat. 558 (Ft. Peck Res.); Act of May
29, 1908, ch. 216, § 15, 35 Stat. 444, 448 (Flathead Res.); Act of Dec. 21, 1904, ch. 22, § 5,
33 Stat. 595, 598 (Yakima Res.); Act of Apr. 21, 1904, ch. 1402, §§ 25-26, 33 Stat. 189, 224
(Yuma, Colorado River & Pyramid Lake Res.). The latter Act expressly refers to the Reclama-
tion Act, and the Fort Peck Act expressly refers to state law. The Yakima Act is discussed
in Status Unit of the Wapato Irrigation Project, 53 Intarior Dec. 622 11932).
103. See United States v. Heinrich, 12 F.2d 938, 940 (D. Mont. 1926), affd on other
grounds, 16 F.2d 112 (9th Cir. 1926) (United States advertised project allotment for sale
with "a perpetual water right"; Act of May 26, 1926, ch. 403, § 8, 44 Stat. 658, 660 (Crow
Res.); Act of Mar. 3, 1921, ch. 135, § 6, 41 Stat. 1355, 1357 (Ft. Belknap Res.); Act of May
18, 1916, ch. 125,39 Stat. 123, 140-42, 153-54 (Flathead, Ft. Peck, Blackfeet, Colville & Yakima
Res.), construed in Patents in Fee, 45 Interior Dec. 600 (1917); Wind River Reservation -
Repayment of Irrigation Construction Costs, 52 Interior Dec. 709 (1929); Cf., Scholder v.
United States, 428 F.2d 1123, 1127-29 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970).
104. See 1906 COMM'NR IND. AFF. ANN. REP., H.R. Doc. No. 5,59th Cong., 2d Sess. 82-84
(1907).
105. See Hundley, supra note 10, at 22-23 (state filings made for 1898 irrigation diver-
sions in Winters); Big Horn Master's Report, supra note 31, at 105-06 (United States and
Indians filed for some but not all diversions).
106. Act of May 30, 1908, ch. 237, § 2, 35 Stat. 558, 560 (Ft. Peck Res.); Act of Mar.
1, 1907, ch. 2285, 34 Stat. 1015, 1035 (Blackfeet Res.); Act of June 21, 1906, ch. 3504, 34
Stat. 375 (Uintah Res.): Act of Mar. 3, 1905, ch. 1452, art. III, 33 Stat. 1016, 1017, 1020
(Wind River Res.).
The Fort Peck and Blackfeet laws include provisions that would modify state water
law in specific ways. In 1914, the Secretary reported to Congress on complications arising
from the administration of these laws. See H.R. Doc. Nos. 1250, 1274, 63d Cong., 3d Sess.
(1914) (Uintah and Wind River Res.). In the case of the Wind River Reservation, Wyoming's
Congressman Mondell made great efforts to get the Indian Service to make state law fil-
ings. See 51 CONG. REC. 3661, 3673 (1914) (Rep. Mondell).
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should make state filings for water rights already in use."' Then the first
court decisions recognizing implied federal reservation water rights were
handed down. 0 8 Congress did not again require that Indian projects ap-
propriate under state law, and state law filings for Indian irrigation pro-
jects became irregular.
Later, a few courts expressly recognized federal reservation rights of
Indian trust lands in both Reclamation Service and Indian Service
projects.' 0' Other irrigation projects have probably relied on federal reser-
vation water rights at least in part. The projects have seldom generated
controversies that require decisions about reservation rights. All lands
irrigated by a project are treated equally. Costs are allocated on a per-
acre basis throughout the project, and water shortages are suffered ratably
among project lands."0 And when projects actually irrigate Indian trust
land or former allotments, few care whether the original water rights were
federal or state, or whether the rights have reservation priority dates or
project priority dates."'
Project allotment water rights that are federal in origin have survived
trust removal and subjection to state law. This has occurred whether the
project water rights were already developed or merely planned at the
trusts' end. In some cases transfers were authorized by explicit statutes.1
2
When the land was undeveloped, both the water right and the debt for
reimbursement were deferred until water was actually delivered. The water
right was not perfected until the debt was paid.
This explicit system was patterned after the Reclamation Act and is
largely separate from the allotment laws governing non-project allotments.
Therefore, the history of project allotments has little relevance to the ques-
tion of disposition of federal water rights when non-project allotments go
out of trust.
107. Irrigation projects have been built on the Crow Reservation in Montana since 1885.
In April 1905, the Indian Service directed the reservation superintendent to file notices of
appropriation under state law for water previously in use. Record at 497, United States v.
Powers, 305 U.S. 527 (1939).
108. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908); United States v. Conrad Investment
Co., 156 F. 123 (C.C.D. Mont. 1907), aff'd, 161 F. 829 (9th Cir. 1908).
109. See Nevada v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2906 (19831 (reviewing 1944 decree accord-
ing reservation priority date to reclamation project water right of Pyramid Lake Res.); United
States v. Ahtanum Irr. Dist., 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied 352 U.S. 988 (1957);
Big Horn Master's Report, supra note 31, at 328-29, Big Horn Adjudication, supra note 31,
No. 4993, slip op. at 66-67 (Wyo. Dist. Ct. May 10, 1983).
110. See Sax, supra note 100, §§ 118.4, 123.2.
111. Whether peace and harmony continue after explicit adjudication of different priority
dates is less certain. In the Big Horn Adjudication, the interim decree awarded project trust
allotments an 1868 priority, all other projects lands (including former allotments) a 1905
priority, and the difference is significant. See Big Horn Master's Report, supra note 31, at
328-29; see also Big Horn Adjudication, supra note 31, No. 4993, slip op. at 66-67 (Wyo.
Dist. Ct. May 10, 1983).
112. See supra note 103.
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Effects of Trust Removal on Water Rights Developed by Allottees
Federal reservation water rights that Indian allottees put to use dur-
ing the federal trust should be recognized as vested property rights that
survive trust removal, subjection to state law, and conveyance to non-
Indians. This protects allottees' investments in the land, and both buyers
and sellers would reasonably expect this value to be transferred. In all
states, developed water rights normally pass with land transfers, and
removal of the federal trust should not counter this assumption. No
substantial conflict with state law results because water put to use with
a known priority date fits nicely into the prior appropriation system of
the western states.
Not to allow developed water rights to survive trust removal would
be contrary to the federal trust purpose of encouraging allottees to become
self-sufficient farmers. Allottees wishing to develop their land using reser-
vation water rights would be deterred from doing so if they would later
be unable to enjoy or transfer the full value of developed water facilities.
More fundamentally, failure to allow developed rights to survive removal
of the trust and subjection to state law might be an unconstitutional
taking.
11 3
The Wyoming state courts have held that no federal reservation water
rights survive the end of the federal trust and conveyance to non-
Indians.'4 The courts did not distinguish between water rights developed
during the trust and those not yet developed at the trust's end, although
it appears that some developed rights were in fact involved.' To that
extent, these cases were wrongly decided.
Only one court has distinguished developed water rights of former
allotments from undeveloped rights. The United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Washington, in Colville Confederated Tribes v.
Walton, decided that state water law ought to apply fully and immediately
113. Indian trust allotment ownership is protected by the fifth amendment. Choate v.
Trapp, 224, U.S. 665 (1912). Whether denying the right to transfer a developed right would
constitute a taking seems a close question. The courts have sustained broad congressional
power over Indian trust property. E.g., Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S.
73 (1977). On the other hand, allottees were strongly encouraged by government agents to
develop their land to fulfill the purpose of the allotment statutes. To strip the value of an
allottee's investment at the trust's end would, at least in some situations, make a strong
case for a taking.
114. Merrill v. Bishop, 74 Wyo. 298, 287 P.2d 620 (1955); Big Horn Master's Report,
supra note 31, at 44-55. Supplemental and Final Report of the Special Master, In re The
General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System and All
Other Sources, State of Wyoming, No. 4993, at 1-6 (Wyo. Dist. Ct. Jun. 1, 19841 [hereinafter
cited as Supplemental Big Horn Master's Report]. The Merrill decision was arguably dic-
tum on this point, but it was treated as a holding in the Big Horn Adjudication.
The Big Horn court also said that the state law priority date for former trust lands
is the date of a state permit or the date the land went out of Indian ownership, whichever
is earlier. Big Horn Adjudication, supra note 31, No. 4993, slip op. at 24, 63 (Wyo. Dist.
Ct. May 10, 1983); Id., No. 101-234, slip op. at 4-5, 15-16 (Wyo. Dist. Ct. Jun. 8, 1984). The
latter standard is hard to understand. Possibly the court meant to refer to the project priority
date for some of the land involved in the case. See supra text accompanying notes 100-10.
115. Supplemental Big Horn Master's Report, supra note 114, at 47.
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after allotments go out of trust and are conveyed to non-Indians."16 But
the court sensed that it would be unfair to declare forfeiture of developed
federal water rights based on the alottees' failure to comply with state
water law.' 7 So the court attempted a compromise. It held that the
developed water rights continued after the trust's end and conveyance
to non-Indians, but the court took away the water rights' reservation
priority date. The court awarded priority based on the dates of the allot-
tees' first use while the land was still in trust. In other words, the court
awarded the priority dates that the water rights would have had if state
law had applied to the allottees during the trust.
This was an ill-considered solution. It immediately made the former
allotments' water rights junior to those of the tribe and of other owners
who had the reservation priority date. In cases when the reservation prior-
ity date is quite senior on the watershed and the dates of an allottee's
actual water use are junior to intervening appropriators, the Walton
court's ruling could destroy the value of an allottee's investment. By con-
trast, if an allottee's dates of use are relatively senior on the watershed
and much better than a new priority under state law, the court's ruling
would allow valuable water rights to outlive the trust and be transferred.
This holding could have led to arbitrary results, but it was reversed on
appeal and no other court has reached a like decision.
There may have been instances in which allotments went out of trust
and were transferred to non-Indians at a time when allottees had begun
water diversion works but had not yet actually diverted some or all of
the water contemplated. To protect allottees' investments, successors
should be allowed to perfect the rights initiated by allottees and should
enjoy the reservation priority date.
The state law doctrine of relation back supports this view. All western
state water law systems recognize a landowner's right to a priority dating
from the beginning of a water development project as long as the owner
has given public notice of intent to develop."" Landowners may transfer
unperfected water rights and if their successors finish development with
reasonable diligence, the priority of the perfected rights will relate back
to the date the prior landowners gave notice."19
When Indian allottees begin water development projects, state law
does not require public notice of intent to develop because allottees' water
rights are governed by federal law. Allottees can also obtain the early reser-
vation priority date. In all other respects, recognition of allottees' rights
116. 460 F.Supp. 1320, 1326-29 (E.D. Wash. 1978), rev'd, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1982). A Wyoming district court and special master relied on
the Walton district court's decision on this point. Big Horn Master's Report, supra note
31, at 44-47, 271, 343; Big Horn Adjudication, supra note 31, No. 4993, slip op. at 21-24,
63 (Wyo. Dist. Ct. May 10, 1983); Supplemental Big Horn Master's Report, supra note 114,
at 2-6.
117. Walton, 460 F. Supp. at 1332-33.
118. See infra note 175 and accompanying text.
119. See Clark & Martz, Nature of Property Rights in Water, in 1 WATERS & WATER
RIGHTS 358-59 JR. Clark ed. 1967).
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to remove the trust and convey incompletely developed water rights sub-
ject to later perfection would merely put allottees on an equal footing with
non-Indians who transfer similarly incomplete projects under state law.
If post-trust owners can perfect allotment water rights by completing
developments begun by allottees, the successors must do so with reason-
able diligence." 0 They then have the same rights they would have acquired
if the allottees had finished their projects during the trust, including reser-
vation priority dates.
If courts recognize developed and partially developed allotment water
rights as vested property rights that survive trust removal and transfer
to non-Indians, state law must respect the rights when the land comes
under state jurisdiction. States can require former allotment owners to
file notice and otherwise adhere to state recording and water management
laws." The water rights themselves will not present difficulties because
the uses that define allotments' federal water rights are beneficial uses
in every western state. 2 Water rights based on beneficial use and with
known priority dates can simply be integrated into state systems.
EFFECTS OF TRUST REMOVAL ON UNDEVELOPED ALLOTMENT WATER RIGHTS
Most former allotments were entirely undeveloped when taken out of
trust.' 23 Consequently, most reported cases on water rights of former
allotments have involved claims to federal reservation water rights that
were not developed, in any sense described above, during the trust period.
That is, during the trust allotment water rights had not been converted
to project rights with the project serving the allotments, nor had the allot-
tees developed or begun to develop their reservation water rights.
It is a difficult question whether undeveloped federal water rights
ought to continue after allotments pass out of trust and come under state
jurisdiction. Unlike developed rights, undeveloped federal water rights
do not involve investments by allottees that ought to be protected. Un-
developed reservation rights also substantially conflict with state laws
that require beneficial use of water.1
24
Court Decisions Allowing Post-Trust Perfection
of Undeveloped Federal Water Rights
The courts have rejected indefinite continuation of undeveloped federal
water rights after removal of the federal trust and conveyance to non-
120. See infra note 175 and accompanying text. The consequences of the relation back
doctrine are greater for former allotment owners because the priority awarded is usually
much earlier than state law would recognize.
121. See 2 S. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES 1130 (3d ed. 1911).
122. See supra note 72. On state law beneficial uses, see D. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN
A NUTSHELL 101-04 (1984).
123. See D. OTIS, THE DAWES ACT AND THE ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN LANDS (F. Prucha
ed. 1973).
124. See D. GETCHES, supra note 122, at 101. For the view that the beneficial use re-
quirement is not necessarily the best policy, see Williams, The Requirement of Beneficial
Use as a Cause of Waste in Water Resource Development, 23 NAT. RESOURCES J. 7, 9 (1983).
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Indians."' But most decisions have allowed owners of former allotments
to perfect as much of the undeveloped federal rights as they put to use
with reasonable diligence after the trust ends.1 2 As stated above, the Wyo-
ming state courts have disagreed and have held that all federal rights ex-
pire when the trust ends and the land is conveyed to non-Indians.
2 7
In Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, the Ninth Circuit sustained
a former allotment owner's right to perfect undeveloped federal water
rights with reasonable diligence.128 The court reasoned that any other
result would impair allottees' property rights, which may not be done
without clear authority in federal law.12 9 This is the classic circular argu-
ment of property law. The allottee was able to transfer a property interest
because the allottee had a property interest. One could as easily decide
that an allottee's right to the undeveloped part of the reservation water
right is a mere opportunity to perfect the right while the land remains
in trust, an opportunity that serves the trust purpose and expires when
the land becomes subject to state law.
Other Indian immunities from state law expire automatically with
transfer out of trust. The most notable is immunity from state taxes. While
the land is in trust, this immunity has been held to be a property interest
of allottees."10 Yet allottees cannot transfer it.1' It is not obvious why
the undeveloped water right-which can also be characterized as an In-
dian immunity from state law-should receive different treatment.
The most important precedent on allotment water rights is the
Supreme Court's 1939 decision in United States v. Powers."' Powers in-
volved water rights of former allotments, and the decision appears to sup-
port a post-trust right to perfect undeveloped federal water rights. But
the case has been treated as inconclusive on the issue, even by courts that
have sustained post-trust perfection.' 33
125. See supra note 114, infra note 126.
126. United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Adair, 723 F.2d at 1417; Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 50-51 (9th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); United States v. Powers, 16 F. Supp. 155, 153
(D. Mont. 1936), affd in part, rev'd in part, 94 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1938), affd, 305 U.S. 527
(1939); United States v. Hibner, 27 F.2d 909, 912 (D. Idaho 1928).
Two opinions of the Montana Supreme Court seem to say the successor has the same
right as the allottee with no reasonable diligence requirement, but the court was following
Powers and probably meant no broader right. Lewis v. Hanson, 124 Mont. 492, 496, 227
P.2d 70, 72 (1951) (dictum); Anderson v. Spear-Morgan Livestock Co., 107 Mont. 18, 27, 79
P.2d 667, 669 (1938) (dictum).
127. See supra text accompanying notes 114-15.
128. Walton, 647 F.2d at 50-51.
129. Id.
130. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912).
131. See 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1982); FELIX S. COHEN, supra note 4, at 413-16. State jurisdic-
tion has been sustained to impose property taxes on non-Indian leaseholds of Indian trust
land. Fort Mojave Tribe v. County of San Bernardino, 543 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977).
132. 305 U.S. 527 (1939).
133. E.g., Walton, 647 F.2d at 50 n.13.
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Powers arose on the Crow Reservation in Montana. Beginning in 1885,
the Interior Department used tribal funds to build irrigation works serv-
ing allotments on the reservation. Non-Indian buyers of Crow Reserva-
tion allotments outside the Indian irrigation projects diverted water in
private ditches built after the government's diversions.134 In the drought
year of 1934, there was not enough water to go around. The United States
sued to enjoin upstream, non-Indian diverters, claiming that they had no
right to any water on the reservation. The allotment purchasers' principal
answer alleged that they had bought undeveloped allotments, then had
irrigated them with reasonable diligence. They claimed that this entitled
them to a "just and equal share" of the reservation water right. 3 '
The United States District Court for the District of Montana denied
the government's claim and quieted title in the purchasers on the theory
they had pleaded. 136 The Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the govern-
ment's claim but vacated the district court's decree quieting title in the
purchasers because all owners on the stream system were not parties.
1 7
The Supreme Court affirmed and concluded: "The [United States has]
shown no right to the injunction asked. We do not consider the extent
or precise nature of respondents' rights in the waters. The present pro-
ceeding is not properly framed to that end.1
138
Based on this conclusion, some commentators have argued that
Powers did not determine whether allotment successors can acquire
undeveloped federal water rights."9 All that the Court decided was that
the purchasers in Powers had some right to water, enough to defeat the
government's attempt to enjoin their diversions. The purchasers' rights
might have been based on water rights developed by the allottees during
the trust, or they might have been based on state law.
134. United States v. Powers, 16 F. Supp. 155, 157-59 (D. Mont. 1936), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 94 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1938), affd, 305 U.S. 527 (1939).
135. Record at 59-98, United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527 (1939) (affirmative defense
of defendants Tschirgi).
136. Powers, 16 F. Supp. at 159.
137. Powers, 94 F.2d at 786.
138. Powers, 305 U.S. at 533.
139. See Dufford, Water for Non-Indians on the Reservation: Checkerboard Ownership
and Checkerboard Jurisdiction, 15 GONZ. L. REV. 95,112-13 n.62 (1979); Getches, Water Rights
on Indian Allotments, 26 S. DAK. L. REV. 405, 423 (1981).
A related argument is that the theory of the United States as plaintiff in Powers would
have denied the transfer of the reservation water right from the tribal beneficiary to allot-
tees at the time trust allotments were first made. Neither the Court nor the parties focused
on the question of a further transfer to successors when allotments went out of trust. Although
this is true, the Court still had to recognize some defect in the Government's case against
defendants, who were all successors. Nevertheless, this argument was accepted by the court
in Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 50 n.13 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1092 (1981). That court reached the same conclusion as Powers, but it did not view
Powers as controlling.
In Merrill v. Bishop, 74 Wyo. 298, 307, 287 P.2d 620, 622 (1955), which involved the
water rights of white owners of former allotments, the Wyoming Supreme Court cited Powers
but said: "We do not find that case to have any particular bearing on the case at bar ......
No reasons were stated.
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State law may allocate whatever water is available after the reserva-
tion water right is satisfied.10 Non-Indians who homesteaded "surplus"
tribal land within reservations have been acquiring state water rights since
the 1890s.14 1 A 1904 statute applicable only to the Crow Reservation had
expressly authorized settlers to use reservation water supplies subject
to the Indians' rights. 42 And a number of the Powers allotment purchas-
ers-possibly all of them-had filed state law notices of appropriation.
4
1
However, state water rights were not the basis of the Powers deci-
sion. Had they been, the Court would have had to determine whether the
Indians' senior rights required abatement of the purchasers' diversions.
Nor was the Court's opinion neutral on the question of the purchasers'
federal water rights. The Court stated:
Respondents maintain that under the Treaty of 1868 waters
within the Reservation were reserved for the equal benefit of tribal
members (Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564) and that when
allotments of land were duly made for exclusive use and thereafter
conveyed in fee, the right to use some portion of tribal waters es-
sential for cultivation passed to the owners.
The respondents' claim to the extent stated is well founded.
1 44
Furthermore, the purchasers' pleadings asserted without contradic-
tion that most of the water rights of the former allotments in Powers had
140. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141, 143-46 (1976); Conrad Investment
Co. v. United States, 161 F. 829, 833-34 (9th Cir. 1908). Contra Walton, 647 F.2d at 52. But
on this issue, Walton is limited to the rare cases where a stream system is entirely within
an Indian reservation. United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1359, 1365 (9th Cir. 1984).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43, 52-56.
142. The Act of Apr. 27, 1904, ch. 1624, 33 Stat. 352, ratified and amended an agree-
ment with the Crow Tribe ceding the northern part of its reservation to the United States.
Congress unilaterally added a new Article VIII providing:
Art. VIII. The right to take out water upon the diminished reservation
subject to any prior claim of the Indians thereto by reason of previous appropria-
tion, and the right to construct, maintain, and operate dams, flumes, and canals
upon and across the said diminished reservation for the purpose of irrigating
lands within any portion of the ceded tract are hereby granted, such rights
to be exercised by persons, companies, or corporations under such rules, regula-
tions, and requirements as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior.
Id. at 359.
There are several citations to the 1904 Act in the Powers record, but none to this sec-
tion. It did not directly apply, because defendants were not irrigators on "the ceded tract"
but were within "the diminished reservation." It is contrary to the Government's theory
as stated in the text. It is arguably contrary to the defendants' theory, because it seems
to make the water rights of allotment successors in "the ceded tract" junior to the Indians.
143. At the initial pleading stage, four defendants relied on claims of state law rights.
Record at 117-33, Powers, 305 U.S. 527 (1939) (counterclaims of defendants Yates); id at
147-52 (first counterclaim of defendants Dethlefsen). The other eleven who answered relied
on claims of succession to federal rights. Id at 59-101. After the pleading stage all defen-
dants relied on federal rights claims. Id at 229-52. But most of them placed in evidence state
law notices of appropriation they had filed. Id. at 127-33, 489-91, 518-21. Since no party was
basing its legal position on state law claims, the trial court did not determine their validity
or extent.
144. Powers, 305 U.S. at 532.
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been undeveloped when the land passed out of trust.145 Hence, the claim
that the Powers Court held that undeveloped federal water rights survive
trust removal is stronger than has been assumed.
There may be reasons for the Supreme Court to reconsider the ques-
tion. No party in Powers was asserting state law. The Court had no
perspective on the decision's effect on state law appropriators who
diverted before the allotment purchasers but whose rights would be junior
to the purchasers' federal rights.'46 Moreover, the government argued only
that no federal water rights passed from the tribe to the allottees.1 47 There
was no focus on the trust's end, conveyance to non-Indians, or the federal
statutes governing these events. But a lower court would be justifiably
reluctant to initiate a reexamination. A Supreme Court opinion like
Powers, even if arguably dictum, casts a long shadow.
Arguments Against Post-Trust Perfection of
Undeveloped Federal Rights
The decisions holding that undeveloped federal water rights of
allotments may be perfected with reasonable diligence after the trust ends
have been strongly criticized.' Critics argue that the continuing immunity
from state water laws upheld in these decisions is not justified by the con-
trolling federal statutes. The purpose of the allotment statutes is to assist
Indian allottees to become self-sufficient agriculturalists. This purpose
is rarely served by allowing non-Indian successors to acquire and perfect
undeveloped federal reservation water rights.""9 The chance to get
undeveloped water rights with an early priority date gives non-Indians
a powerful incentive to induce Indians to sell undeveloped allotments.
When this occurs, the federal purpose that allottees use the land to become
self-sufficient is usually thwarted.
Critics of post-trust perfection also argue that non-Indian allotment
successors did not expect to enjoy the undeveloped part of the allotments'
federal water rights. They point out that non-Indian successors have usual-
145. Record at 43-166, 305 U.S. 527 (1939) (answers); Record at 167-228, id. (replies).
Two defendants showed water uses developed during the trust by the Indian allottees from
whom they had bought their land, although they also claimed additional water diverted after
their purchase. Record at 152-59, id. (second counterclaim of defendants Dethlefsen); Record
at 167-77, id. (reply).
146. The streams involved were not wholly within the Crow Reservation, although some
off-reservation claims were in Wyoming, presenting an interstate complication. Record at
58, Powers, 305 U.S. 527 (1939).
147. See supra note 139.
148. See D. Getches, Water Law in a Nutshell, 312-14 (1984); Dufford, supra note 139,
at 101-21; Getches, supra note 139, at 420-23; Note, 17 LAND & WATER L. REV. 155, 160-68
(1982); Note, Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton. Indian Water Rights and Regulation
in the Ninth Circuit, 43 MONT. L. REV. 247, 259-63 (1982); Note, 58 WASH. L. REv. 89, 95-100,
108-09 (1982).
149. This assumes that the consideration received by allottees will not be reinvested
in productive assets, an assumption borne out by past events. See FELIX S. COHEN, supra
note 4, at 136-38, 144.
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ly sought to appropriate new water rights under state law. 150 If purchasers
did not expect to acquire undeveloped federal water rights, presumably
they did not pay allottees for them. They receive a windfall if courts later
decide that they own undeveloped rights.
One consequence of any federal water right surviving the end of the
trust and transfer to non-Indians is that the amount of land sharing in
the reservation water right with its early priority date remains large. Ag-
gressive non-Indian owners then compete with the tribe and with remain-
ing trust allottees.'5 ' In times of shortage, there may be less water for
each owner than needed. This consequence is justified for water rights
developed by allottees during the trust, but it is questionable for
undeveloped rights in which allottees have made no investments.
Critics of post-trust perfection advocate that the undeveloped part
of an allotment's federal water right should expire when the allotment
is taken out of trust and subjected to state jurisdiction.'52 They contend
that this rule is more consistent with the purposes of the governing federal
statutes, it is favored by the usual federalism theory that federal preemp-
tion of state law should not outlast the federal purpose, and it would reduce
disruption of western state water law. Moreover, this rule would avoid
the complexities caused by the post-trust perfection rule that most courts
follow because the courts' rule requires adjudication of allotment suc-
cessors' due diligence in perfecting undeveloped federal rights. 53
150. No study of this question has been found, but reported decisions show that many
successors made state filings. See supra note 143; Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton,
460 F. Supp. 1320, 1324, 1331-33 (E.D. Wash. 1978), rev'd, 647 F.2d 42, 51-53 (9th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Big Horn Master's Report, supra note 31, at 46; Sup-
plemental Big Horn Master's Report, supra note 114, at 4-5.
151. See Getches, supra note 139, at 425.
A factor that determines who are the opposing parties to a case is the disposition of
the part of the undeveloped water right, if any, that does not survive removal of the trust
and transfer to non-Indians. In any western state, the water would first become available
to meet shortages for holders of existing rights with the same priority date (the reservation
date), then to holders of junior rights, usually under state law. In a particular case, the gain
may be enjoyed by a tribe, by other allottees or successors, by non-Indians claiming under
state law, or even by later federal reservations. Another factor is the reacquisition in trust
of former allotments, usually by tribes. In this circumstance, tribes benefit from transfer
of undeveloped rights. United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984).
152. See supra note 148. This view was advocated by the United States in Colville Con-
federated Tribes v. Walton, 460 F. Supp. 1320, 1326-29 (E.D. Wash. 1978), rev'da 647 F.2d
42 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). It was not accepted by either the district
or appeals courts. See supra text accompanying notes 116, 126.
153. An alternative rule would eliminate the undeveloped right upon transfer to non-
Indians unless the parties intended a transfer. Intent would be presumed in the case of
gratuitous transfers by descent or devise but would have to be proved in the case of pur-
chases, that is, it would have to be shown that transfer of the undeveloped water right was
contemplated and that the right was paid for. This view was advocated by the United States
after remand and in light of the appellate opinion in Walton. Memorandum for the United
States, May 5, 1982, Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, Nos. 3421, 3831 (E.D. Wash.
Aug. 31, 1983), rev'd No. 83-4285 (9th Cir. Jan. 21, 1985). It was rejected by the district
court based on law of the case. Walton, No. 84-3504, slip op. at 1-8. The United States did
not appeal.
This theory seems doubtful for two reasons. First, it focuses on transfer rather than
on application of state law. Second, when a property owner's intent to make a transfer is
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Arguments for Allowing Post-Trust Perfection
Proponents of post-trust perfection have several responses to these
arguments. Post-trust perfection accords Indian allottees more to sell or
give to their successors. The available evidence suggests that Indian
sellers have benefited very little from this right, but future Indian sellers
might and gratuitous transfers to heirs and devisees present a more sym-
pathetic case."5 4
Proponents can also point out that the conflict between the post-trust
perfection rule and state water law is relatively minor. If allotment rights
must be perfected with reasonable diligence, then they are treated like
projects governed by the state law doctrine of relation back.' Some
western states are in fact quite lenient in their definitions of reasonable
diligence and allow a very long time to perfect.,-
Proponents of post-trust perfection can partially answer the argument
about buyers' expectations. While it is true that most non-Indian suc-
cessors filed for state law water rights after acquiring former allotments,
these filings were not clearly inconsistent with successors' later claims
to federal water rights. Doubt about federal rights may have led cautious
buyers to file in case the federal rights were not upheld. The Indian Ser-
vice itself made many state law filings prior to Winters.' 7 Some successors
may have filed because it was the cheapest way to obtain cooperation of
a district engineer or other state official hostile to federal rights. Also,
owners of former allotments probably must comply with procedural state
laws in order to retain and perfect federal water rights. In most western
states they would have to file notices of appropriation. These arguments
are undercut, however, by the fact that most allotment successors filed
for new priority dates and did not claim reservation priority dates.
Post-Trust Perfection Should Be Upheld
If the courts were deciding the issue on a clean slate, a rule that an
allotment's undeveloped federal water right expires when the allotment
goes out of trust and becomes subject to state law is preferable because
it is more faithful to the purposes of the governing federal statutes. This
rule would not be inequitable because other Indian immunities from state
law expire with the trust. Also, this rule would place buyers of former
at issue, the question is whether the owner intended to transfer the interest or to retain it.
Here, the proposed rule would extinguish a water right not intended to be transferred. The
benefit would accrue to some third party appropriator usually unknown to the grantor. No
grantor intends that result.
154. Another affirmative policy argument is that to some degree the post-trust perfec-
tion rule will promote alienability of land. But a basic purpose of the federal scheme is to
restrain alienability.
155. See infra note 175 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., Carbon Canal Co. v. Sanpete Water Users Ass'n, 10 Utah 2d 376, 353
P.2d 916 (1960).
157. See supra notes 104-108 and accompanying text.
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allotments on an equal footing with homesteaders of ceded reservation
common land who acquired under the public land laws.""
However, the issue is not a new one. Thousands of allotments have
gone out of trust in the past. Some post-trust water uses have been con-
tinuous for very long periods. The resulting reliance interest is an impor-
tant social value strongly reflected in the law of ptoperty.
Assessing the legitimate reliance interest of former allotment owners
is complex, and there is evidence both for and against actual reliance." 9
One question already discussed is the inference to be drawn from the fact
that most non-Indian buyers of former allotments filed for state water
rights. This factor suggests that buyers did not rely on federal water
rights, but it is inconclusive.
A related question is whether undeveloped federal water rights were
reflected in allotment prices when allotments were conveyed out of trust.
Limited evidence suggests that they were not.60 More information could
be obtained by reviewing Bureau of Indian Affairs appraisal practices.
All sales directly out of trust require appraisals.16 ' But the appraisals are
unlikely to be helpful for several reasons. First, at the time of early
transfers, undeveloped water rights in some locations had no positive
value, that is, water was not yet scarce enough to make undeveloped rights
worth more than new appropriations. Second, the valuation of undeveloped
rights is difficult and has been worked out in concrete terms only recent-
ly. It would be hard to fault a 1920 appraiser for ignoring a value he had
no practical way to measure. Third, it is quite possible that the appraisals
will show no valuation of undeveloped water rights either for transfers
in trust or for transfers out of trust. If so, the appraisals would ignore
the undeveloped right transfer during the trust, which no one has ques-
tioned.
16 12
The most important factor favoring a legitimate reliance interest is
legal precedents. The first decision sustaining a post-trust right to perfect
158. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
159. Judging the reasonable expectations of non-Indians who have acquired property
from Indians is a difficult challenge for courts because many non-Indians believed that In-
dians should yield all their resources to the "superior" whites. For example, in the Winters
case, the courts found the idea that the non-Indian defendants could take all Milk River water
and leave the Indians none to be unreasonable, but many politicians disagreed. See Hundley,
supra note 10, at 22, 27-28, 31-32, 36-37, 40-42. In other cases, the courts have bowed to
the political will. See e.g., United States v. Ahtanum Irr. Dist., 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 988 (1957).
160. Appraisals for two allotments acquired by non-Indians in the 1920s and a copy of
the appraisal rules followed by the Department at that time are in the record of the Walton
case. United States Exhibits 59, 60, Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, Nos. 3421, 3821
(E.D. Wash. 1983). These show that irrigable and irrigated acres were valued more than others,
but they show no recognition that an appurtenant water right was being transferred.
161. See 25 C.F.R. § 152.24 (1984); 43 C.F.R. § 4.301 (1984). When a trust allotment is
sold by the United States as grantor and trustee, there is an appraisal. When an allotment
goes out of trust through a fee patent to an Indian allottee, heir, or devisee, there is usually
no appraisal even if the patentee immediately sells the land.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 77-78.
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undeveloped federal water rights was reported in 1928.163 It was followed
in obiter dicta several times thereafter, it was not seriously challenged
until the 1970s, and it was reaffirmed in several recent decisions."" There
may have been reasonable reliance on these precedents by allotment
buyers or others who bought from them.
Even if Powers is not controlling, when it is considered with the more
explicit precedents, the chances are significant that owners of former
allotments have reasonably relied on acquiring undeveloped federal water
rights. This consideration should outweigh the policy reasons favoring
expiration of undeveloped rights at the trust's end, and the courts should
continue to sustain the right to post-trust perfection of federal water rights
if developed with reasonable diligence.
When Undeveloped Federal Water Rights Are Lost
None of the federal court opinions expressly addressed the question
of when the diligence requirement arises. It could arise at the trust's end,
or perhaps there must also be subjection to state law or conveyance to
non-Indians or both. If all three events have occurred, a court need not
consider the issue.
Subjection of a former allotment to state law ought to be an event
relevant to the reasonable diligence requirement. It is state law that re-
quires beneficial use of water as a condition of water rights ownership.
Therefore, when allotments outside Indian reservation boundaries go out
of trust, the diligence requirement should be imposed even if Indian allot-
tees retain ownership. Whether the owners of former allotments are In-
dians or non-Indians, the land and its owners are subject to state law for
all relevant purposes. 16'
Allotments within self-governing Indian reservations pose harder
questions. If Indian allottees retain ownership, the land and its owners
remain immune from state jurisdiction. 66 Even if the land is conveyed
to non-Indians, it does not come under state jurisdiction for all purposes.
In Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, former allotments owned by
non-Indians were located on a water system entirely within a self-
163. United States v. Hibner, 27 F.2d 909 (D. Idaho 1928).
164. See supra note 126 and cases cited therein. See also Clyde, Indian Water Rights
in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 145.1 (R. Clark ed. 1967); FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK
OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 220 (Gov't Printing Office 1941) ("The Powers case compels the
view that the right to use water is a right appurtenant to the land within the reservation,
and that unless excluded it passes to each grantee in subsequent conveyances of allotted
land."); Op. Solic. Dep't of Interior (Mar. 14, 1958), reprinted in 2 OPINIONS OF THE SOLICITOR
OF THE DEP'T OF THIE INTERIOR RELATING TO INDIAN AFFAIRS 1829 (Gov'T PRINTING OFFICE
1978); TRELEASE, Indian Water Rights for Mineral Development, in NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW ON AMERICAN INDIAN LANDS 222, 231 (P. Maxfield ed. 1977).
165. See FELIX S. COHEN, supra note 4, at 348-49.
166. Id. at 349-52, 380, 410-11.
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governing Indian reservation. 167 The Colville Tribes claimed exclusive
jurisdiction over the water against the State of Washington, and the Ninth
Circuit sustained the claim. But the court required that the undeveloped
federal water right be put to use with reasonable diligence. The court later
held that the diligence requirement was a rule of federal law. State law
on reasonable diligence was considered only for "guidance. '"68 Therefore,
the court imposed this requirement either because of the trust's end or
because of the trust's end and conveyance to non-Indians. We cannot be
sure which events triggered the diligence requirement because the court
did not discuss the point.
1 69
If the requirement of diligent perfection arises solely as a consequence
of the trust's end, it would apply to reservation Indian owners of former
allotments as well as to non-Indian owners. This would present
troublesome questions in light of the manner in which former allotments
held by reservation Indians have been treated. There was a period when
the Bureau of Indian Affairs issued fee patents to Indians without their
consent and sometimes over their objections.170 At other times, the Bureau
required allotments to be taken out of trust simply to make an inter vivos
transfer to another Indian."' Even when Indians voluntarily took reser-
vation allotments out of trust, the federal policy to assist reservation In-
dian self-sufficiency still applies to them." 2 In this situation, it is contrary
to the allotment statutory scheme to end undeveloped water rights of
former allotments if the Indian owners do not put the water to use with
reasonable diligence.
An analogous question is posed by the Wyoming courts' expiration
rule, which is advocated by critics of post-trust perfection.17 3 Undeveloped
federal water rights might expire solely as a consequence of trust removal,
or the courts might also require that former allotments come under state
jurisdiction, be conveyed to non-Indians, or both. In the Big Horn River
Adjudication, which involved former allotments owned by reservation In-
dians, a Wyoming district court held that the federal water rights of these
parcels did not expire when taken out of trust.174 For federal water rights
167. 647 F.2d 42, 51-53 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). The water
system is a creek and connected underground aquifer that empty into a saline lake without
an outlet. The creek had no name before the litigation. Its denomination as "No Name Creek"
by the litigants became a proper name during the case.
168. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, No. 83-4285, slip op. at 5 (9th Cir. Jan. 21,
1985).
169. The tribal jurisdiction question was decided differently when the water source flowed
outside a reservation as well as within, as is commonly the case. In United States v. Ander-
son, 736 F.2d 1358, 1363-66 (9th Cir. 1984), the court held that state jurisdiction then ap-
plies to reservation allotments acquired by non-Indians.
170. See Officer, supra note 97, at 66-68; supra note 60.
171. No statute generally authorizes inter vivos transfers. At the present time, the Bureau
allows them under statutes authorizing trust removal from grantors together with statutes
allowing new trust titles for grantees. See 25 C.F.R. § 151.3(b) (1984). For many years, some
local Bureau officials refused to allow new trust titles for grantees.
172. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 114-15, 152-53.
174. Big Horn Master's Report, supra note 31, at 128-34, 270-71, 330; Big Horn Ad-
judication, supra note 31, No. 4993, slip op. at 24, 67.
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to expire under the Wyoming rule, the allotments must either be conveyed
to non-Indians, or come under state jurisdiction, or both. The Wyoming
court correctly refused to impose the state courts' expiration rule on
former allotments still owned by reservation Indians.
Reasonable Diligence
As shown above, the majority rule allows allotment successors to
perfect undeveloped federal water rights if done with reasonable diligence.
Water rights that are partially developed by allottees during the trust
present a compelling case for the same right. These rules require courts
to decide how promptly allotment water rights must be perfected after
allotments go out of trust.
Western state water law offers a possible standard in the relation back
doctrine. Under that doctrine, a would-be appropriator may give notice
of a planned diversion scheme or otherwise show the intent to appropriate.
If the scheme is then pursued to completion within a reasonable time and
with due diligence, the water right acquired has the priority date of the
initial notice, rather than the later date of actual water diversion.'15 If this
doctrine is applied to former allotments, the owners (at least those who
are subject to state law) would have to give notice promptly after the trust
ends and then develop their diversion projects with reasonable diligence.
Having done so, they would be rewarded with the early reservation priority
dates. The first court to sustain post-trust perfection of undeveloped
federal water rights on former allotments seemed to refer to state law on
relation back."'
Applied to undeveloped allotments, the relation back doctrine requires
adjustment. When a would-be appropriator gives notice or forms an in-
tent under state law, a specific diversion must already be proposed in order
to make the notice meaningful. When an allotment goes out of trust and
becomes subject to state law, there would have to be a reasonable plan-
ning time to formulate a project and give notice. But allotments are not
large parcels, so this need not be long. States can propose standards ap-
propriate to their laws.
The only reported case in which reasonable diligence in perfecting
undeveloped federal water rights on former allotments has been ad-
judicated is Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton.'" The Ninth Circuit
held that federal law controlled, but state law on reasonable diligence under
the relation back doctrine would be examined for "guidance."171 The court
then applied state law precedents to the facts and determined how much
water had been put to use within a reasonable time after the allotments
175. See D. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 93-99, 147-48 (1984); F. TRELEASE,
WATER LAW 98-99 (3d ed. 1979).
176. United States v. Hibner, 27 F.2d 909, 912 (D. Idaho 1928).
177. Walton, No. 83-4285 (9th Cir. Jan. 21, 1985).
178. I slip op. at 4-5.
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had gone out of trust."9 The decision reversed a federal district court's
astonishing conclusion that water development begun more than twenty-
three years after allotments went out of trust was undertaken with
reasonable diligence.'
The Ninth Circuit's reference to state law for "guidance" appears to
be an application of the rule that federal property law ordinarily adopts
state law rules of decision.' The court had already determined that the
former allotments involved in the case were governed by tribal rather than
state law,' so this rule was arguably inappropriate. But the parties did
not try to show that tribal law on the question would be any different
from state law, so the court did not have to choose between conflicting
laws.
CONCLUSION
Federal water rights of Indian allotments have been gradually defined
by adjudication. It is settled that allotments out of tribal land have an
appurtenant right to use a proportionate share of the reservation water
right for agricultural purposes. If a reservation has a federal water right
for other purposes as well, its relation to the agricultural water rights of
allotments complicates both quantification of rights and management of
stream systems.
Disposition of federal reservation water rights is less settled when
allotments go out of trust, become subject to state law, and are acquired
by non-Indians. Results have varied from the rights' elimination to their
full continuation subject to a loose requirement that they be put to use
within a reasonable time. In part this is because courts see widely differ-
ing circumstances, and most cases involve particular reliance claims based
on events of many years before.
179. Id. slip op. at 9-12. Since 1917, Washington has required an appropriator to obtain
a permit before undertaking a water use, then to begin and complete construction within
the time allowed by the state supervisor of water resources. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.03.250,
.320 (1962). In setting and extending time limits and assessing an applicant's diligence, the
supervisor is to consider "the cost and magnitude of the project and the engineering and
physical features to be encountered, and shall allow such time as shall be reasonable and
just under the conditions then existing, . . .having due regard to the good faith of the appli-
cant and the public interests affected." Id § 90.03.320.
This section seems to require that an allotment successor who is subject to state law
get a state permit soon after the trust ends, to give notice to other users. The state law's
diligence standard after a permit is obtained might be applied by analogy to determine how
promptly the permit should be sought.
180. Nos. 3421, 3831, slip op. at 2-7 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 31, 1983), rev 'd, No. 83-4285, (9th
Cir. Jan. 21, 1985). This proceeding followed the remand ordered in 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981).
The court's August 31, 1983 opinion stated that the three allotments in question went
out of trust and were acquired by non-Indian purchasers in 1921, 1923, and 1925. The Waltons
acquired them by purchase in 1948. The district court awarded the Waltons a federal reser-
vation water right to irrigate 104 acres, seventy-four acres of which were newly irrigated
by the Waltons after 1948.
181. Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 671-76 (1979.
182. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
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Whenever allottees have invested in water development, the federal
water rights actually or partially developed should be vested property
rights that are not affected by the end of the trust or conveyance to non-
Indians. States should be able to impose only procedural requirements
such as notice. Any other rule would at times unfairly destroy the value
of allottees' investments.
A more difficult question is whether undeveloped federal reservation
water rights may be perfected after the trust ends. The policies of gover-
ning federal statutes and principles of federalism favor expiration of any
portion of the right that is wholly undeveloped when allotments go out
of trust and become subject to state law. But most reviewing courts have
sustained post-trust perfection of undeveloped rights if put to use with
reasonable diligence after the trust ends. One of these decisions, United
States v. Powers, was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Whether Powers
is a controlling precedent on post-trust perfection of undeveloped federal
rights has been disputed, but one can make a good argument that it is.
Since almost all adjudications of allotment water rights have been in the
federal courts of the Ninth Circuit, the scope of Powers is a crucial ques-
tion for other courts. Powers is doubtful enough to justify its reexamina-
tion, but it is likely to be followed. If it is, the principal issue remaining
for the courts is to define the diligence required to perfect undeveloped
federal water rights.
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